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Charter Detention and the Exclusion 
of Evidence after Grant,  
Harrison and Suberu 
Jonathan Dawe and Heather McArthur* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The quartet of judgments released by the Supreme Court of Canada 
on July 17, 2009 — R. v. Grant, R. v. Suberu, R. v. Harrison and R. v. 
Shepherd1 — are among the Court’s most important criminal law Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms2 decisions in recent years, making 
major changes to the law governing the section 9 right against arbitrary 
detention, the section 10(b) right to counsel, and the exclusion of uncon-
stitutionally obtained evidence under section 24(2). Most significantly, 
Grant overturns 22 years of settled section 24(2) jurisprudence that 
emphasized the importance of “trial fairness” and the principle against 
self-incrimination. The Court has substantially modified the seminal 
Collins test and effectively reversed its 1997 decision in R. v. Stillman, 
where a majority held that unconstitutionally obtained and otherwise 
                                                                                                             
*
 Sack Goldblatt Mitchell LLP and McArthur Barristers. This paper has previously been 
published in (2010) 56 Crim. L.Q. 376, and is reprinted with permission. An earlier version of this 
paper appeared in the Criminal Lawyers’ Association (Ontario) newsletter, For the Defence, Vol. 30, 
No. 4. 
1
 R. v. Grant, [2009] S.C.J. No. 32, 2009 SCC 32 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Grant”]; R. v. 
Suberu, [2009] S.C.J. No. 33, 2009 SCC 33 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Suberu”]; R. v. Harrison, [2009] 
S.C.J. No. 34, 2009 SCC 34 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Harrison”]; and R. v. Shepherd, [2009] S.C.J. No. 
35, 2009 SCC 35 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Shepherd”]. One of the authors of this paper (JD) was coun-
sel for the appellant in Grant and for the intervener Canadian Civil Liberties Association in 
Harrison. Of the four cases, Grant serves as the lead judgment on the ss. 9 and 24(2) issues, while 
Suberu is the lead judgment on s. 10(b). Suberu is also important as an example of the Court apply-
ing the Grant detention framework to its facts, while Harrison is important as an example of the 
Court applying the new Grant s. 24(2) test to a case involving egregious police misconduct. Shep-
herd is the least significant of the new decisions, since the Court finds no Charter violation and does 
not reach the s. 24(2) issue.  
2
 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
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undiscoverable conscriptive evidence “must be excluded”3 to preserve 
the fairness of the trial. Grant thus opens the door to a considerable 
amount of evidence that would have been excluded under the 
Collins/Stillman approach now being ruled admissible. At the same time, 
the Court’s decision in Harrison may give new teeth to the principle that 
courts cannot be seen to condone serious police misconduct, since this 
would send the message to the public that Charter rights are unimportant. 
Grant also clarifies the meaning of detention under sections 9 and 10 
of the Charter, although the majority muddies the waters when it applies 
its new test to the facts of Suberu and surprisingly finds no detention. 
The Court also holds for the first time that unlawful detentions are neces-
sarily arbitrary and contravene section 9. With respect to the right to 
counsel, Suberu establishes that a section 10(b) caution must be given 
“immediately” after a detention crystallizes, reversing the Ontario Court 
of Appeal’s holding in the decision on appeal that section 10(b) permits 
“a brief interlude between the commencement of an investigative deten-
tion and the advising of the detained person’s right to counsel”.4 The 
Supreme Court also holds that the duty to give a section 10(b) caution is 
triggered by a Mann “investigative detention”, a point that was expressly 
left open in Mann itself.5 Finally, Grant addresses the elements of the 
Criminal Code’s “weapons trafficking” offences,6 reversing the trial 
court and the Ontario Court of Appeal’s extremely broad interpretation of 
“trafficking”. As interpreted by the Supreme Court, a person who merely 
moves a weapon from place to place, without more, does not commit a 
“weapons trafficking” offence.7 
                                                                                                             
3
 R. v. Stillman, [1997] S.C.J. No. 34, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607, at para. 122 (S.C.C.) [hereinaf-
ter “Stillman”]. 
4
 R. v. Suberu, [2007] O.J. No. 317, 218 C.C.C. (3d) 27, at para. 50 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter 
“Suberu (C.A.)”]. 
5
 R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59, at para. 22 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Mann”]. 
6
 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 99 (“weapons trafficking”) and s. 100 (“posses-
sion for purpose of weapons trafficking”). Both sections rely on the definition of “transfer” in s. 84.  
7
 Mr. Grant was convicted at trial of the s. 100(1) Criminal Code offence of “possession for 
the purpose of weapons trafficking”, which makes it an offence for a person to possess a firearm for the 
purpose of unlawfully “transferring” it. Section 84 defines “transfer” to mean “sell, provide, barter, 
give, lend, rent, send, transport, ship, distribute or deliver”. On a literal reading of this definition, a 
person who merely moves a gun from one place to another could be said to “transport” it, and thus 
“transfer” it within the meaning of ss. 84, 99 and 100. Mr. Grant was convicted at trial on the basis that 
he had “transported” the gun within the meaning of ss. 84 and 100 by carrying it while walking down 
the street, and his conviction was upheld by the Ontario Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court of Canada 
unanimously disagreed with the broad interpretation adopted by the trial judge and the Court of Appeal, 
concluding (supra, note 1, at para. 144) that “Parliament did not intend s. 100(1) to address the sim-
ple movement of a firearm from one place to another”, or impose a substantial mandatory minimum 
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II. DETENTION AND SECTIONS 9 AND 10 
1. The Meaning of Detention: R. v. Grant  
In one of its earliest Charter decisions, R. v. Therens,8 the Supreme 
Court of Canada held that the concept of detention in sections 9 and 10 
of the Charter is not limited to physical restraint or legal compulsion. 
Rather, as Le Dain J. explained (writing for the Court on this issue): 
[I]t is not realistic, as a general rule, to regard compliance with a 
demand or direction by a police officer as truly voluntary, in the sense 
that the citizen feels that he or she has the choice to obey or not, even 
where there is in fact a lack of statutory or common law authority for 
the demand or direction and therefore an absence of criminal liability 
for failure to comply with it. Most citizens are not aware of the precise 
legal limits of police authority. Rather than risk the application of 
physical force or prosecution for wilful obstruction, the reasonable 
person is likely to err on the side of caution, assume lawful authority 
and comply with the demand. The element of psychological 
compulsion, in the form of a reasonable perception of suspension of 
freedom of choice, is enough to make the restraint of liberty 
involuntary. Detention may be effected without the application or threat 
of application of physical restraint if the person concerned submits or 
acquiesces in the deprivation of liberty and reasonably believes that the 
choice to do otherwise does not exist.9 
In Grant and Suberu, the Court revisits and expands on this holding.  
(a) The Facts of Grant 
One afternoon in November 2003, two plainclothes officers, Consta-
ble Worrell and Constable Forde, were on patrol in the Greenwood and 
Danforth area of Toronto. They were not investigating any particular 
                                                                                                             
sentence on people who simply move a firearm from one place to another without legal authorization. 
The Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of ss. 99 and 100 offences accords with what was plainly 
Parliament’s intent. The Code’s “weapons trafficking” provisions are structurally indistinguishable from 
the “drug trafficking” provisions in the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19 and its 
predecessor legislation. On a literal reading of the CDSA definition of “trafficking”, which also includes 
the word “transport”, a person who walked down the street with a joint of marijuana in his or her pocket 
could be convicted as a “drug trafficker”. For over 40 years Canadian courts have consistently avoided 
this absurd result by construing the definition of “traffic” in a narrower, non-literal manner (see, e.g., R. 
v. Harrington, [1963] B.C.J. No. 98, [1964] 1 C.C.C. 189, at 193-98 (B.C.C.A.)). Parliament would 
have been aware of this jurisprudence and almost certainly intended the ss. 99 and 100 “trafficking” 
offences to be interpreted similarly.  
8
 [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Therens”]. 
9
 Id., at 644. 
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crime, and had no information that any crime had recently been commit-
ted. They noticed Donnohue Grant, an 18-year-old black male who was a 
stranger to them, walking down the sidewalk. The officers said they be-
came suspicious when they saw Mr. Grant “fidgeting with his coat” and 
staring at them in an unusual manner. However, it was undisputed that 
they had no grounds to lawfully arrest him or detain him for investigative 
purposes.  
Constable Worrell and Constable Forde directed a nearby uniformed 
officer, Constable Gomes, to “have a chat” with Mr. Grant and “see 
what’s up with him”. Constable Gomes left his vehicle and approached 
Mr. Grant, directing him to “keep his hands in front of him” in plain 
view. Mr. Grant complied, and Constable Gomes proceeded to question 
him about where he was going, what he was doing, and whether he had 
ever been arrested. This questioning lasted for approximately six min-
utes. About two minutes into this interrogation, Constable Worrell and 
Constable Forde left their vehicle and joined Constable Gomes on the 
sidewalk, standing behind him and blocking the sidewalk in the direction 
Mr. Grant had been walking. When Constable Gomes asked whether Mr. 
Grant “had anything on him that he shouldn’t”, Mr. Grant initially replied 
“No,” but then admitted that he had “a small bag of weed” in his coat 
pocket. Constable Gomes then asked “Is that it?” Mr. Grant hung his 
head and replied: “Well, no.” After further questioning from Cst. Gomes, 
Mr. Grant eventually admitted: “I have a firearm.” The three officers then 
arrested and searched him, finding a loaded revolver in a waist pouch 
under his coat and a small bag of marijuana in his coat pocket. When 
Constable Worrell asked Mr. Grant why he had a gun, he replied that he 
was “just dropping it off … up the road”. Mr. Grant was charged with a 
variety of firearms offences, including the Criminal Code section 
100(1)(a) offence of possession of a weapon “for the purpose of … trans-
ferring it”.10 
(b) The Judgments Below 
Mr. Grant’s defence at trial was primarily Charter based: he argued 
that the police infringed his sections 8, 9 and 10(b) Charter rights when 
they stopped and questioned him, and sought to have both his inculpatory 
responses and the seized gun excluded under section 24(2). Since it was 
undisputed that the police did not have sufficient grounds to lawfully 
                                                                                                             
10
  Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. This count is discussed at footnote 7, supra. 
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detain Mr. Grant before he answered their questions, the central issue 
was whether he was “detained” for Charter purposes before he made his 
inculpatory utterances. The trial judge concluded that Mr. Grant was not 
detained, characterizing the police questioning as mere “chit chat”. The 
Ontario Court of Appeal disagreed, concluding that Mr. Grant was arbi-
trarily detained during the initial questioning, in violation of his section 9 
rights.11 The Court declined to address Mr. Grant’s argument that his sec-
tion 10(b) Charter right was also infringed, in part because it was “an 
open question” whether section 10(b) was triggered by an investigative 
detention short of an arrest.12 The Ontario Court of Appeal went on to 
admit the evidence under section 24(2).13 
(c) The Supreme Court of Canada’s Detention Analysis  
Mr. Grant appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, primarily on 
the section 24(2) issue.14 In response, the Crown sought to uphold the 
result in the court below by arguing that Mr. Grant’s section 9 rights had 
not been infringed because he was not “detained” when he made his in-
culpatory admission. The Crown urged the Supreme Court to apply a 
lower level of Charter scrutiny to “community-based policing”. 
The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously concluded that Mr. 
Grant was arbitrarily detained. Chief Justice McLachlin and Charron J. 
wrote joint majority reasons,15 while Deschamps J. wrote a separate con-
currence. Justice Binnie wrote separate reasons setting out his 
disagreement with the majority’s approach to the detention issue, but he 
agreed with the majority’s conclusion on the facts.16  
The Chief Justice and Charron J. began their reasons by commenting 
that “the existing jurisprudence on the issues of detention and exclusion 
of evidence is difficult to apply and may lead to unsatisfactory results”, 
and that the Court should thus “take a fresh look at the frameworks that 
have been developed for the resolution of these two issues”.17 On the 
detention issue, the majority acknowledged that “a generous, purposive 
                                                                                                             
11
 R. v. Grant, [2006] O.J. No. 2179, 209 C.C.C. (3d) 250 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Grant 
(C.A.)”]. 
12
 Id., at para. 31.  
13
 This issue is discussed in Section III, below. 
14
 He also challenged the Ontario Court of Appeal’s interpretation of s. 100 of the Criminal 
Code (see footnote 7, supra). 
15
 LeBel, Fish and Abella JJ. concurring. 
16
 See Section II.1.d, infra.  
17
 Grant, supra, note 1, at para. 3. 
386 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
and contextual approach should be applied” to the interpretation of con-
stitutional provisions,18 but cautioned that “[w]hile the twin principles of 
purposive and generous interpretation are related and sometimes con-
flated, they are not the same.”19 The purpose of the right is the dominant 
concern, while generosity of interpretation is subordinate to and con-
strained by the purpose. Thus, the language of sections 9 and 10 of the 
Charter must be construed in a generous manner that “furthers, without 
overshooting, its purpose”.20 
The Grant majority noted that everyone in Canada enjoys a broad 
right to liberty, both at common law and under section 7 of the Charter. 
The broad purpose of section 9 is the protection of individual liberty, 
both physical and mental, from unjustified state interference:  
[Section] 9 guards not only against unjustified state intrusions upon 
physical liberty, but also against incursions on mental liberty by 
prohibiting the coercive pressures of detention and imprisonment from 
being applied to people without adequate justification.21 
The concept of detention must be interpreted in accordance with this 
purpose, and with regard to the fact that detention triggers the section 10 
Charter right to counsel, which is “designed to ensure that the person 
whose liberty has been curtailed retains an informed and effective choice 
whether to speak to state authorities, consistent with the overarching 
principle against self-incrimination” and to “ensure that the person who 
is under the control of the state be afforded the opportunity to seek legal 
advice in order to assist in regaining his or her liberty”.22 The majority 
noted that: 
[W]hile the forms of interference s. 9 guards against are broadly 
defined to include interferences with both physical and mental liberty, 
not every trivial or insignificant interference with this liberty attracts 
Charter scrutiny. To interpret detention this broadly would trivialize the 
applicable Charter rights and overshoot their purpose. Only the 
individual whose liberty is meaningfully constrained has genuine need 
of the additional rights accorded by the Charter to people in that 
situation.23  
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 Id., at para. 15. 
19
 Id., at para. 17. 
20
 Id. 
21
 Id., at para. 20. 
22
 Id., at para. 22. 
23
 Id., at para. 26. 
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The majority reaffirmed the holding in Therens that a detention for 
sections 9 and 10 purposes can arise through either physical or psycho-
logical restraint. The Chief Justice and Charron J. identified two distinct 
forms of “psychological detention”:  
The first is where the subject is legally required to comply with a 
direction or demand, as in the case of a roadside breath sample. The 
second is where there is no legal obligation to comply with a restrictive 
or coercive demand, but a reasonable person in the subject’s position 
would feel so obligated.24 
In the latter situation, the perceptions of a reasonable person must be 
determined objectively, focusing “on the state conduct in the context of 
the surrounding legal and factual situation, and how that conduct would 
be perceived by a reasonable person in the situation as it develops”.25 
However, the majority added:  
While the test is objective, the individual’s particular circumstances 
and perceptions at the time may be relevant in assessing the 
reasonableness of any perceived power imbalance between the 
individual and the police, and thus the reasonableness of any perception 
that he or she had no choice but to comply with the police directive. To 
answer the question whether there is a detention involves a realistic 
appraisal of the entire interaction as it developed, not a minute parsing 
of words and movements. In those situations where the police may be 
uncertain whether their conduct is having a coercive effect on the 
individual, it is open to them to inform the subject in unambiguous 
terms that he or she is under no obligation to answer questions and is 
free to go. It is for the trial judge, applying the proper legal principles 
to the particular facts of the case, to determine whether the line has 
been crossed between police conduct that respects liberty and the 
individual’s right to choose, and conduct that does not.26 
In its prior decision in Mann, the Court (per Iacobucci J.) had held 
that: 
[T]he police cannot be said to “detain”, within the meaning of ss. 9 and 
10 of the Charter, every suspect they stop for purposes of identification, 
or even interview. The person who is stopped will in all cases be 
“detained” in the sense of “delayed”, or “kept waiting”. But the 
constitutional rights recognized by ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter are not 
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 Id., at para. 30. 
25
 Id., at para. 31. 
26
 Id., at para. 32, see paras. 30-32. 
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engaged by delays that involve no significant physical or psychological 
restraint.27 
The Grant majority reaffirmed this holding, noting that not all po-
lice-citizen interactions involving some physical delay or police 
questioning will necessarily amount to a Charter detention. For example, 
the Chief Justice and Charron J. stated: 
In many common situations, reasonable people understand that the 
police are not constraining individual choices, but rather helping people 
or gathering information. For instance, the reasonable person would 
understand that a police officer who attends at a medical emergency on 
a 911 call is not detaining the individuals he or she encounters. This is 
so even if the police in taking control of the situation, effectively 
interfere with an individual’s freedom of movement. Such deprivations 
of liberty will not be significant enough to attract Charter scrutiny 
because they do not attract legal consequences for the concerned 
individuals.28 
Even when the police are investigating a crime, not every interaction 
they have with a witness or potential suspect will necessarily give rise to 
a detention: 
 In the context of investigating an accident or a crime, the police, 
unbeknownst to them at that point in time, may find themselves asking 
questions of a person who is implicated in the occurrence and, 
consequently, is at risk of self-incrimination. This does not preclude the 
police from continuing to question the person in the pursuit of their 
investigation. Section 9 of the Charter does not require that police 
abstain from interacting with members of the public until they have 
specific grounds to connect the individual to the commission of a 
crime. Nor does s. 10 require that the police advise everyone at the 
outset of any encounter that they have no obligation to speak to them 
and are entitled to legal counsel.  
 Effective law enforcement is highly dependent on the cooperation 
of members of the public. The police must be able to act in a manner 
that fosters this cooperation, not discourage it. However, police 
investigative powers are not without limits. The notion of 
psychological detention recognizes the reality that police tactics, even 
in the absence of exercising actual physical restraint, may be coercive 
enough to effectively remove the individual’s choice to walk away 
from the police. This creates the risk that the person may reasonably 
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 Mann, supra, note 5, at para. 19. 
28
 Grant, supra, note 1, at para. 36. 
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feel compelled to incriminate himself or herself. Where that is the case, 
the police are no longer entitled simply to expect cooperation from an 
individual. Unless, as stated earlier, the police inform the person that he 
or she is under no obligation to answer questions and is free to go, a 
detention may well crystallize and, when it does, the police must 
provide the subject with his or her s. 10(b) rights. That the obligation 
arises only on detention represents part of the balance between, on the 
one hand, the individual rights protected by ss. 9 and 10 and enjoyed by 
all members of society, and on the other, the collective interest of all 
members of society in the ability of the police to act on their behalf to 
investigate and prevent crime.29 
The majority acknowledged that “neighbourhood policing” could 
sometimes raise “[a] more complex situation”, in which “the non-
coercive police role of assisting in meeting needs or maintaining basic 
order can subtly merge with the potentially coercive police role of inves-
tigating crime and arresting suspects”.30 In such cases, the focus can shift 
from community-oriented concern to focused suspicion: 
Focussed suspicion, in and of itself, does not turn the encounter in[to] a 
detention. What matters is how the police, based on that suspicion, 
interacted with the subject. The language of the Charter does not 
confine detention to situations where a person is in potential jeopardy 
of arrest. However, this is a factor that may help to determine whether, 
in a particular circumstance, a reasonable person would conclude he or 
she had no choice but to comply with a police officer’s request. The 
police must be mindful that, depending on how they act and what they 
say, the point may be reached where a reasonable person, in the 
position of that individual, would conclude he or she is not free to 
choose to walk away or decline to answer questions.31 
The Grant majority summarized its conclusions as follows: 
1. Detention under ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter refers to a suspension 
of the individual’s liberty interest by a significant physical or 
psychological restraint. Psychological detention is established 
either where the individual has a legal obligation to comply with 
the restrictive request or demand, or a reasonable person would 
conclude by reason of the state conduct that he or she had no 
choice but to comply. 
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 Id., at paras. 38-39. 
30
 Id., at para. 40. 
31
 Id., at paras. 40-41. 
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2. In cases where there is no physical restraint or legal obligation, it 
may not be clear whether a person has been detained. To determine 
whether the reasonable person in the individual’s circumstances 
would conclude that he or she had been deprived by the state of the 
liberty of choice, the court may consider, inter alia, the following 
factors: 
a) The circumstances giving rise to the encounter as would 
reasonably be perceived by the individual: whether the 
police were providing general assistance; maintaining 
general order; making general inquiries regarding a 
particular occurrence; or, singling out the individual for 
focussed investigation. 
b) The nature of the police conduct, including the language 
used; the use of physical contact; the place where the 
interaction occurred; the presence of others; and the 
duration of the encounter. 
c) The particular characteristics or circumstances of the 
individual where relevant, including age; physical stature; 
minority status; level of sophistication.32 
The Grant majority also resolved the outstanding question of 
whether an unlawful detention is necessarily “arbitrary” and contrary to 
section 9. Some early Charter cases, notably the Ontario Court of Ap-
peal’s decision in R. v. Duguay,33 had suggested that an unlawful 
detention would not be “arbitrary” if it was not also “capricious” or “ran-
dom”. The Grant majority rejected this approach, holding that section 9 
should be interpreted to mirror the section 8 guarantee against unreason-
able search and seizure: 
[Under the s. 8 jurisprudence] a search must be authorized by law to be 
reasonable; the authorizing law must itself be reasonable; and the 
search must be carried out in a reasonable manner. Similarly, it should 
now be understood that for a detention to be non-arbitrary, it must be 
authorized by a law which is itself non-arbitrary.34  
The majority noted that if a law permits arbitrary detentions, the re-
sulting infringement of section 9 might be justified under section 1.35 
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 Id., at para. 44. 
33
 [1985] O.J. No. 2492, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.). 
34
 Grant, supra, note 1, at para. 56. 
35
 Id., at para. 56, citing R. v. Hufsky, [1988] S.C.J. No. 30, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Hufsky”] and R. v. Ladouceur, [1990] S.C.J. No. 53, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257 (S.C.C.). 
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(d) Justice Binnie’s Dissent 
Although Binnie J. agreed that Mr. Grant was “detained”, he wrote 
separate reasons expressing his disagreement with the majority’s deten-
tion analysis.36 In his view, the existence or non-existence of a Charter 
detention should not depend solely on the perceptions of a reasonable 
person in the subject’s shoes. Rather, he believed “more attention should 
be paid to the objective facts of the encounter between a police officer 
and members of the public, whether or not such facts are made apparent 
to the person stopped”.37 These external facts would sometimes support 
the conclusion that the subject was detained, and sometimes have the 
opposite effect. Justice Binnie expressed concern that the majority’s de-
tention test will be uncertain in its application, since so much depends on 
the particular qualities attributed to the hypothetical reasonable person 
placed in the subject’s position. He stated: 
Insistence that the claimant’s circumstances be viewed from the more 
detached perspective of a “reasonable person” provides in some cases a 
welcome corrective, but in other cases, by exaggerating the ability of 
ordinary people to stand up to police assertion of authority, that 
approach may compel the conclusion that the claimant had the choice 
to walk away whereas in reality no such choice existed.38 
In his opinion, when viewed purely from the subject’s perspective a 
great many police-citizen encounters would properly be seen as involv-
ing detentions, given “the Canadian reality” recognized in Therens that 
most members of the public “will almost always regard a direction from 
a police officer as a demand that must be complied with”.39 However, 
Binnie J. believed such a broad conception of detention cannot be justi-
fied on a purposive approach to sections 9 and 10 of the Charter, since 
many people who reasonably believe they are being detained by the po-
lice actually “do not reasonably require the assistance of counsel”.40 
Conversely, “the device of putting in [the subject’s] place an artificially 
robust and assertive ‘reasonable person’”41 can exclude cases where a 
                                                                                                             
36
 Justice Deschamps also wrote a separate concurrence in which she briefly addressed the 
issue of detention on the facts of the case, agreeing with the majority and Binnie J. that Mr. Grant 
was detained. Her concurrence focused on the s. 24(2) issue and her disagreement with the new  
s. 24(2) framework adopted by the majority (discussed below in Section III).  
37
 Grant, supra, note 1, at para. 175, per Binnie J. 
38
 Id., at para. 166, per Binnie J. 
39
 Id., at para. 170, per Binnie J.  
40
 Id. 
41
 Id., at para. 169, per Binnie J. 
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detention should be recognized on a purposive approach, because “the 
liberty interest of the person stopped is truly at issue”.42 He observed: 
This gap between the reality on the street and the court constructed 
“reasonable person” is of particular relevance to visible minorities who 
may, because of their background and experience, feel especially 
unable to disregard police directions, and feel that assertion of their 
right to walk away will itself be taken as evasive and later be argued by 
the police to constitute sufficient grounds of suspicion to justify a 
Mann detention.43  
Justice Binnie concluded: 
 In the absence of explicit criteria, various judges will tend to read 
into the “reasonable person” their own projections of the moment at 
which, in their view, the person stopped ought to be able to call a 
lawyer. This creates the risk of a very results-oriented analysis. 
Perceptions will vary depending on the personality of the judge seized 
with the case. My colleagues emphasize at different places the need for 
deference to the assessment of the trial judges (e.g., para. 43) which 
may further complicate the task of developing a consistent approach. In 
other words, continued reliance on the “reasonable person” whose 
attributed experience and choice of criteria are unspecified except for a 
presumed commitment to “reasonableness” helps to mask rather than 
clarify the actual criteria being applied by the Court.44 
Further, in his opinion: 
 A central problem with the … claimant-centred approach … is that 
it does not take adequately into account what the police know and when 
they knew it except insofar as this information is conveyed to the 
person stopped, but which the police may not consider to be in their 
interest to convey. Police may know … if a crime has allegedly been 
committed and whether they are making the approach to an individual 
with a view to obtaining general information or, on the other hand, 
corralling a suspect and collecting admissible evidence to bring him or 
her to justice. Possession of such knowledge may in fact place the 
police in an adversarial relationship to the person approached whether 
that person is aware of the jeopardy or not. It is the adversarial 
relationship together with the “stop” that generates the need for 
counsel. At that point, the power imbalance is significant. The 
unsuspecting suspect may fatally compromise his or her position 
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simply through ignorance of his or her rights and the fact the police 
have now adopted an adversarial position. At that point, as Le Dain J. 
put it in Therens, “a person may reasonably require the assistance of 
counsel” (pp. 641-42), but may not have any idea of the perilous turn of 
events.45 
2. Section 10(b): R. v. Suberu 
The rights in section 10 of the Charter are guaranteed to “[e]veryone 
… on arrest or detention”. In Hufsky,46 the Court held that detention has 
the same meaning in sections 9 and 10. However, in R. v. Mann the Court 
raised the possibility that not every section 9 Charter detention would 
necessarily trigger the full panoply of section 10 rights. Mann recognized 
a common law power authorizing the police to conduct brief “investiga-
tive detentions”, based on a standard of reasonable suspicion. The Court 
held that persons detained pursuant to this power must “[a]t a minimum 
… be advised, in clear and simple language, of the reasons for the deten-
tion,” as required by s. 10(a).47 However, the Court (per Iacobucci J.) 
declined to address whether these detainees must also be advised of their 
section 10(b) rights, stating:  
Section 10(b) of the Charter raises more difficult issues. It enshrines the 
right of detainees “to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to 
be informed of that right”. Like every other provision of the Charter, s. 
10(b) must be purposively interpreted. Mandatory compliance with its 
requirements cannot be transformed into an excuse for prolonging, 
unduly and artificially, a detention that, as I later mention, must be of 
brief duration. Other aspects of s. 10(b), as they arise in the context of 
investigative detentions, will in my view be left to another day. They 
should not be considered and settled without the benefit of full 
consideration in the lower courts, which we do not have in this case.48 
Subsequently, in R. v. Orbanski,49 a majority of the Court held that 
motorists detained under a provincial highway traffic statute did not have 
to be advised of their section 10(b) rights, holding that the statute con-
tained an implied exemption from the section 10(b) informational duties 
that could be justified under section 1.  
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Accordingly, when Grant and Suberu were argued there was some 
uncertainty surrounding the exact relationship between section 9 “deten-
tions” and the police informational duties in section 10(b).50 The section 
10(b) Charter issue appeared to have more practical significance in 
Suberu than in Grant, and the two appeals were argued on this basis.51 
The Court made its judgment in Suberu the lead decision on the section 
10(b) issue, although it rather surprisingly proceeded to decide the 
Suberu appeal itself on the basis that the defendant was not detained — 
an issue the Crown had conceded in every level of court. 
(a) The Facts of Suberu 
Mr. Suberu and another man used a stolen credit card to purchase 
items from several stores, including gift certificates from a liquor store. 
Later that day, the other man tried to use one of these certificates to buy 
beer at a different liquor store in a nearby town. The store staff knew 
about the earlier fraudulent gift certificate purchase and called the police. 
Constable Roughley responded to the call, and was advised by another 
officer that there were two male suspects in the store. When he entered 
the store, he saw the other officer speaking with a male customer. Mr. 
Suberu left the store, saying to Constable Roughley as he walked past: 
“He did this, not me, so I guess I can go.” Constable Roughly followed 
Mr. Suberu outside, and as he was getting into his vehicle told him: 
“Wait a minute. I need to talk to you before you go anywhere.” He pro-
ceeded to question Mr. Suberu about who he was and what he was doing. 
While he was doing so, he received a radio report advising that the men 
who had used the stolen credit card earlier in the day had been driving 
the vehicle in which Mr. Suberu was now sitting. Constable Roughley 
asked Mr. Suberu to produce identification and vehicle registration  
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 Section 10(b) gives detainees “the right to retain and instruct counsel without delay and 
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papers. As Mr. Suberu was locating these documents, the officer noticed 
bags in the vehicle from some of the stores where the stolen credit card 
had been used. At this point, he arrested Mr. Suberu for fraud and ad-
vised him for the first time of his right to counsel.  
(b) Proceedings in the Courts Below 
At trial, Mr. Suberu argued that he had been detained at the point that 
the officer told him to “wait” and began questioning him, and that the 
officer should at that point have advised him of his section 10(b) rights. 
The trial judge agreed that there was a “momentary investigative deten-
tion”, but held that the officer was not obliged to inform Mr. Suberu of 
his right to counsel before asking him preliminary exploratory questions. 
The summary conviction appeal court held that Mann “investigative de-
tentions” do not engage section 10(b). Mr. Suberu appealed further to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal. Justice Doherty, writing for the Court of Ap-
peal, agreed that Mr. Suberu had been “detained” (as the Crown had 
conceded, both in the Court of Appeal and in the courts below), and held 
that “investigative detentions” do trigger section 10(b). However, he in-
terpreted the words “without delay” in section 10(b) as permitting a brief 
period at the beginning of an investigative detention during which the 
officer may ask exploratory questions to determine whether a lengthier 
detention is required, before informing the detainee of his or her right to 
counsel. He concluded that applying this standard to the facts of Suberu, 
there was no section 10(b) violation. 
The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously52 rejected the summary 
conviction appeal court’s holding that section 10(b) is not triggered by 
“investigative detentions”, and also rejected Doherty J.A.’s interpretation 
of the term “without delay” in section 10(b). Noting that Mann had left 
open the question of “whether the police duty to inform an individual of 
his or her section 10(b) Charter right to retain and instruct counsel is 
triggered at the outset of an investigative detention”, the Court held: 
It is our view that this question must be answered in the affirmative. 
The concerns regarding compelled self-incrimination and the 
interference with liberty that s. 10(b) seeks to address are present as 
soon as a detention is effected. Therefore, from the moment an 
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individual is detained, s. 10(b) is engaged and, as the words of the 
provision dictate, the police have the obligation to inform the detainee 
of his or her right to counsel “without delay”.  
Further, the Court found Doherty J.A.’s interpretation of the term “with-
out delay” to be inconsistent with a purposive interpretation of section 
10, stating: 
 A situation of vulnerability relative to the state is created at the 
outset of a detention. Thus, the concerns about self-incrimination and 
the interference with liberty that s. 10(b) seeks to address are present as 
soon as a detention is effected. In order to protect against the risk of 
self-incrimination that results from the individuals being deprived of 
their liberty by the state, and in order to assist them in regaining their 
liberty, it is only logical that the phrase “without delay” must be 
interpreted as “immediately”. If the s. 10(b) right to counsel is to serve 
its intended purpose to mitigate the legal disadvantage and legal 
jeopardy faced by detainees, and to assist them in regaining their 
liberty, the police must immediately inform them of the right to counsel 
as soon as the detention arises. 
 To allow for a delay between the outset of a detention and the 
engagement of the police duties under s. 10(b) creates an ill-defined 
and unworkable test of the application of the s. 10(b) right. The right to 
counsel requires a stable and predictable definition. What constitutes a 
permissible delay is abstract and difficult to quantify, whereas the 
concept of immediacy leaves little room for misunderstanding. An ill-
defined threshold for the application of the right to counsel must be 
avoided, particularly as it relates to a right that imposes specific 
obligations on the police. In our view, the words “without delay” mean 
“immediately” for the purposes of s. 10(b). Subject to concerns for 
officer or public safety, and such limitations as prescribed by law and 
justified under s. 1 of the Charter, the police have a duty to inform a 
detainee of his or her right to retain and instruct counsel, and a duty to 
facilitate that right immediately upon detention.53  
The Court also declined to adopt the Crown’s suggestion and create a 
common law rule suspending section 10(b) duties during investigative de-
tentions, holding that no case had been made out for justifying such a 
general suspension of rights under section 1.54 Rather, the Court suggested 
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that a general suspension was unnecessary having regard to “the pur-
posive approach to detention taken in Grant”: 
Because the definition of detention, as understood in these reasons, 
gives the police leeway to engage members of the public in non-
coercive, exploratory questioning without necessarily triggering their 
Charter rights relating to detention, s. 1 need not be invoked in order to 
allow the police to effectively fulfill their investigative duties.55 
3. The Majority’s Detention and Section 10(b) Tests Applied: Grant 
and Suberu 
Applying its analytic framework for determining the existence of a 
detention to the facts in Grant, the majority found that Mr. Grant was 
detained:  
 Although Cst. Gomes was respectful in his questioning, the 
encounter was inherently intimidating. The power imbalance was 
obviously exacerbated by Mr. Grant’s youth and inexperience. Mr. 
Grant did not testify, so we do not know what his perceptions of the 
interaction actually were. However, because the test is an objective one, 
this is not fatal to his argument that there was a detention. We agree 
with Laskin J.A.’s conclusion that Mr. Grant was detained. In our view, 
the evidence supports Mr. Grant’s contention that a reasonable person 
in his position (18 years old, alone, faced by three physically larger 
policemen in adversarial positions) would conclude that his or her right 
to choose how to act had been removed by the police, given their 
conduct. 
 The police conduct that gave rise to an impression of control was 
not fleeting. The direction to Mr. Grant to keep his hands in front, in 
itself inconclusive, was followed by the appearance of two other 
officers flashing their badges and by questioning driven by focussed 
suspicion of Mr. Grant. The sustained and restrictive tenor of the 
conduct after the direction to Mr. Grant to keep his hands in front of 
him reasonably supports the conclusion that the officers were putting 
him under their control and depriving him of his choice as to how to 
respond. 
 We conclude that Mr. Grant was detained when Cst. Gomes told 
him to keep his hands in front of him, the other two officers moved into 
position behind Cst. Gomes, and Cst. Gomes embarked on a pointed 
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line of questioning. At this point, Mr. Grant’s liberty was clearly 
constrained and he was in need of the Charter protections associated 
with detention.56 
Although Binnie J. disagreed with the majority’s approach to the de-
tention issue, he agreed with this conclusion, as did Deschamps J. in her 
separate concurrence. Since it was undisputed that any detention of Mr. 
Grant was unlawful and arbitrary, the Court unanimously found a breach 
of his section 9 Charter rights. It was undisputed that the police had not 
advised Mr. Grant of his right to counsel. Applying its holding in Suberu, 
the Court also found a section 10(b) violation.57 
In Suberu, on the other hand, the majority found that the defendant 
had not been detained prior to his arrest, notwithstanding that the Crown 
had conceded throughout the proceedings that he was detained, a conces-
sion all of the courts below accepted.58 In the majority’s view:  
 ... As a whole, the circumstances of the encounter support a reasonable 
perception that Constable Roughley was orienting himself to the 
situation rather than intending to deprive Mr. Suberu of his liberty.59  
According to the majority, the exchange between Constable Rough-
ley and Mr. Suberu, during which Mr. Suberu asked if he could leave and 
Constable Roughley replied that he could not, was ambiguous: 
In the context, these words admit more than one interpretation. They 
might be understood as, “I need to talk to you to get more information”. 
They might also be construed as an order not to leave, suggestive of 
putting Mr. Suberu under police control. In interpreting these words, it 
is relevant to note that Constable Roughley made no move to obstruct 
Mr. Suberu’s movement. He simply spoke to him as he sat in his van. 
Further, while the exact duration of the encounter is not clear on the 
record, it was characterized by the Court of Appeal as a “very brief 
dialogue” (para. 17). Taken as a whole, the conduct of the officer 
viewed objectively supports the trial judge’s view that what was 
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happening at this point was preliminary questioning to find out whether 
to proceed further.60 
Although neither Mr. Grant nor Mr. Suberu testified on their respec-
tive Charter voir dires, in Grant the Court held that this was “not fatal” to 
Mr. Grant’s detention argument, since the detention analysis was ulti-
mately objective. In Suberu, however, the majority placed considerable 
emphasis on the fact that Mr. Suberu had not himself given evidence.61  
Justices Binnie and Fish dissented, holding that the facts of Suberu 
gave rise to a detention under the Grant majority’s test. In Binnie J.’s 
view, the exchange between the officer and Mr. Suberu “clearly estab-
lished an unambiguous police order”: 
Constable Roughley’s words were only ambiguous if one ignores the 
preceding remark from Mr. Suberu. Constable Roughley was replying 
to Mr. Suberu, who had essentially said, “Can I leave?”, by essentially 
saying, “No”. It was clear to Mr. Suberu that he was not free to go 
“anywhere” and any reasonable person in that position would have 
come to the same conclusion. At that point there was, within the 
meaning of the test in Grant, a detention, in my view, which was 
unsupported at that stage by any grounds of reasonable suspicion as 
required by R. v. Mann …. My colleagues point out correctly that 
Constable Roughley did not try physically to obstruct Mr. Suberu’s 
movement but that is why this is a case of psychological, not physical, 
detention.62 
In his view, “[i]f a finding of detention in these circumstances pro-
duces an anomalous result then a re-examination of the claimant-centred 
test is warranted.”63 Justice Binnie suggested that Suberu may be “one of 
the cases where taking into account the police perspective — even 
though it was unknown to Mr. Suberu — might have strengthened the 
Crown’s case”.64 Justice Fish wrote his own brief dissenting reasons ex-
plaining that he agreed with the Grant majority’s test for detention but 
agreed with Binnie J.’s application of this test to the facts of Suberu.65 
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4. Analysis 
On its face, the Grant majority’s section 9 analytic framework is not 
radically different from the tests arising out of the earlier Charter deten-
tion jurisprudence. Before Grant, one of leading cases on the factors to 
be considered when assessing whether or not there was a detention was 
the Ontario Court of Appeal’s 1987 decision in R. v. Moran,66 in which 
Martin J.A. set out a non-exhaustive list of seven relevant considerations: 
1. The precise language used by the police officer in requesting the 
person who subsequently becomes an accused to come to the 
police station, and whether the accused was given a choice or 
expressed a preference that the interview be conducted at the 
police station, rather than at his or her home; 
2. whether the accused was escorted to the police station by a police 
officer or came himself or herself in response to a police request; 
3. whether the accused left at the conclusion of the interview or 
whether he or she was arrested; 
4. the stage of the investigation, that is, whether the questioning was 
part of the general investigation of a crime or possible crime or 
whether the police had already decided that a crime had been 
committed and that the accused was the perpetrator or involved in 
its commission and the questioning was conducted for the purpose 
of obtaining incriminating statements from the accused; 
5. whether the police had reasonable and probable grounds to believe 
that the accused had committed the crime being investigated; 
6. the nature of the questions: whether they were questions of a 
general nature designed to obtain information or whether the 
accused was confronted with evidence pointing to his or her guilt; 
7. the subjective belief by an accused that he or she is detained, 
although relevant, is not decisive, because the issue is whether he 
or she reasonably believed that he or she was detained. Personal 
circumstances relating to the accused, such as low intelligence, 
emotional disturbance, youth and lack of sophistication are 
circumstances to be considered in determining whether he had a 
subjective belief that he was detained.67 
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Moran involved a police station interview, and some of the Moran 
factors are specific to this particular context. However, later cases had 
adapted the Moran factors to better fit other situations, including police-
citizen street encounters. Most of the specific factors listed in Grant ma-
jority’s three-prong detention test have direct counterparts in Moran.68 
However, the two sets of factors are not completely identical. For in-
stance, the Grant majority supplements the list of personal attributes 
listed in the seventh Moran branch by adding “physical stature” and 
“minority status” as relevant considerations. Justice Binnie’s concurring 
reasons (dissenting on the legal framework, but concurring in the result) 
are also sensitive to the issue of race, noting: 
A growing body of evidence and opinion suggests that visible 
minorities and marginalized individuals are at particular risk from 
unjustified “low visibility” police interventions in their lives. … The 
appellant, Mr. Grant, is black. Courts cannot presume to be colour-
blind in these situations.69 
The majority and Justice Binnie’s frank and express recognition of 
race as a relevant consideration in the detention analysis is a welcome 
development.  
As Binnie J. points out in his dissent, the majority’s “claimant-
centred” test appears to ignore the fourth and fifth Moran factors, to the 
extent that they involve matters unknown to the claimant. However, it is 
important to note that the Grant factors are not necessarily exhaustive, 
and are specifically presented as bearing on the issue of psychological 
detention. If the police have formed reasonable and probable grounds to 
arrest a suspect and have decided to physically stop the suspect if he or 
she tries to leave, it remains at least arguable that the suspect is physi-
cally detained at this point, even if he or she remains ignorant of the 
detention for some further period.  
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At several points in its judgment, the Grant majority notes that the 
police will sometimes be able to prevent a detention from crystallizing 
by specifically informing the subject that he or she is free to leave: 
In those situations where the police may be uncertain whether their 
conduct is having a coercive effect on the individual, it is open to them 
to inform the subject in unambiguous terms that he or she is under no 
obligation to answer questions and is free to go.70 
While it is hard to dispute the relevance of such a statement by the 
police, it should not be seen as dispositive in every case. Even if the po-
lice tell a person that he or she does not have to answer any questions 
and can leave, the subject may not understand this, or may not believe it. 
In some cases, the assurance will be contradicted by subsequent police 
actions. Trial courts will also have to grapple with the fact that the police 
and the subject will often give very different accounts of the encounter 
and of what was said. It is essential that trial judges not treat this kind of 
police assurance as a prophylactic, but continue to examine all of the 
circumstances when considering whether there has been a detention. This 
is particularly important given the Grant majority’s repeated statement 
that trial judges’ decisions on detention should be afforded “appropriate 
deference”.71 
Further, the Suberu majority’s conclusion that Mr. Suberu was not 
detained is startling and troubling. If the police can sometimes prevent a 
detention from crystallizing by “inform[ing] the subject in unambiguous 
terms that he or she is under no obligation to answer questions and is free 
to go”, as the Grant majority holds, the converse should also be true: un-
ambiguously telling the subject that he or she is not free to go should 
almost invariably trigger a detention. With respect, the Suberu majority’s 
characterization of the exchange between the officer and Mr. Suberu as 
ambiguous is unpersuasive. As Binnie J. points out in his dissent, in es-
sence Mr. Suberu asked the officer if he was allowed to leave, and the 
officer replied: “No.” Justice Binnie adds: 
Generally speaking, the police mean what they say when they direct a 
citizen to stay put. … No rational person in Mr. Suberu’s position 
would have thought that he was free to walk away or that the police 
would have let him go, had he tried.72 
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It is difficult not to see the Suberu majority as backpedalling to avoid 
the practical implications of its expansive approach to section 10(b).  
In the first three months following Grant and Suberu, a number of 
lower courts have applied the Grant detention framework. In several of 
these cases the Crown conceded that there had been a detention.73 How-
ever, in R. v. Peacock,74 where the existence of a detention was contested, 
Greene J. of the Ontario Court of Justice applied the Grant framework to 
find a detention. The police had approached the defendant as he walked 
down the street, ordered him to “stop”, and “launch[ed] into a pointed 
inquiry … focused on their suspicions of criminal conduct … [which] 
quickly escalated into questions about any contraband he may be carry-
ing”.75 Justice Greene found that this amounted to an arbitrary detention, 
and also found that the police failure to advise the defendant of his right 
to counsel violated section 10(b). 
On the other hand, in R. v. Connor76 Molloy J. of the Ontario Supe-
rior Court interpreted Grant and Suberu as narrowing the meaning of 
detention, relying on the new decisions to reverse her own previous find-
ing that the defendant had been detained. The police had executed a 
search warrant on Mr. Connor’s home, looking for child pornography. 
The lead investigating officer testified that although he did not initially 
think he had sufficient grounds to arrest Mr. Connor, he “would not have 
permitted Mr. Connor to leave, even if Mr. Connor had asked”.77 The 
trial judge found: 
… that Mr. Connor felt intimidated and believed he was not free to 
leave. That was a reasonable conclusion on his part, and indeed correct; 
the police had no intention of allowing him to leave at that stage of the 
inquiry.78 
The police did not advise Mr. Connor of his right to counsel, and he 
made some inculpatory admissions. Shortly before Grant and Suberu 
were released, the trial judge ruled orally, with written reasons to follow, 
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 See, e.g., R. v. Crocker, [2009] B.C.J. No. 1816, 2009 BCCA 388 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
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that there had been a detention but no section 10(b) violation, based on 
the Ontario Court of Appeal’s holding in Suberu that there could be a 
“brief interlude” between the onset of a detention and the duty to give a 
section 10(b) caution. In her subsequent written reasons, Molloy J. ac-
knowledged that the Supreme Court of Canada had overturned the Court 
of Appeal on this point. Nevertheless, she upheld her previous conclusion 
that there was no section 10(b) Charter breach by reversing herself on the 
detention issue. She explained:  
 Although the circumstances in the case before me do not fall easily 
within the Grant test, it is nevertheless useful to consider the three 
factors within the test. There was no physical restraint of Mr. Connor. 
However, the police were executing a search warrant and would not 
have permitted Mr. Connor to simply wander about or leave while that 
was ongoing. In that sense, he was “detained” or “delayed,” but this is 
not dissimilar from police restraining individuals who attempt to enter a 
crime scene. Mr. Connor was not detained at that point because of who 
he was, or because he had been singled out, but rather because he 
happened to be on the scene when the search warrant was being 
executed. Further, the police objective was merely to explain the 
warrant to Mr. Connor and to keep him out of the way while the search 
proceeded. No questions were asked. Accordingly, the analysis of the 
circumstances under the first factor in Grant favours a conclusion that 
there was no detention within the meaning of s. 10(b). 
 The second factor deals with the nature of the police conduct. 
There was nothing about that conduct, in and of itself, that would 
suggest Mr. Connor was detained. There was virtually no physical 
contact, the police tone was polite, no orders were issued to Mr. 
Connor, the tone of voice used was calm and professional, no weapons 
were drawn and the duration of the encounter was very brief. Again, 
this analysis supports a finding that Mr. Connor was not detained. 
 With respect to the third factor, Mr. Connor had been a firefighter 
for 22 years, he was well acquainted with many police officers 
professionally, his own brother was a police officer, he was in a 
position of some authority as acting captain of his fire station and he 
was proficient in martial arts as well as being an instructor of martial 
arts. He was not unsophisticated. All of these facts point to a person 
who would not be easily intimidated by the police and support a 
determination that there was no detention in this case.79 
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Justice Molloy acknowledged that “it seems odd to say that there was 
no detention of Mr. Connor in circumstances where he clearly perceived 
he was not free to leave and the police clearly would not have permitted 
him to leave if he had asked”.80 However, she read Suberu as justifying 
this conclusion: 
I recognize that in Suberu the police officer told Mr. Suberu not to 
leave before he had spoken to him and then proceeded to ask a number 
of questions, which Mr. Suberu answered. Also, as was noted by 
Binnie J. in his dissenting opinion, the officer himself testified that if, 
instead of answering questions, Mr. Suberu had attempted to drive 
away in his van, he would have given chase and effected a vehicle stop. 
I do not see that situation as being substantially different from the 
situation with Mr. Connor. If anything, there was less of a detention in 
Mr. Connor’s situation as the officers did not say anything to detain or 
delay him and did not ask him any questions.  
 Accordingly, it seems to me that an application of the Grant test, 
as further expanded on in Suberu, leads to the conclusion that there was 
no detention of Mr. Connor in this case up to the point of his arrest. 
Still, it seems strange to find no detention in circumstances where both 
the police and Mr. Connor believed that his liberty was restricted.81 
Justice Molloy’s interpretation of the Grant and Suberu detention 
analysis can be criticized.82 As the Grant majority explained, the key 
question is “whether the reasonable person in the individual’s circum-
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stances would conclude that he or she had been deprived by the state of 
the liberty of choice”.83 The enumerated “Grant factors” are not meant to 
be an exhaustive test, but are simply considerations that may in some 
cases help shed light on this issue. Justice Molloy found as fact that Mr. 
Connor believed he was being detained and, further, that his belief was 
not only objectively reasonable, but correct. Having already reached this 
conclusion, her close examination of the Grant factors arguably caused 
her to lose sight of the forest for the trees.84 Right or wrong, however, her 
ruling illustrates both the malleability and imprecision of the Grant test, 
and the possibility that Suberu may be understood by lower courts as 
substantially raising the bar for a finding of a detention. 
III. SECTION 24(2) 
1. The Collins/Stillman Framework 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s first major section 24(2) decision, R. 
v. Collins,85 released in 1987, established the now-familiar three-part ana-
lytical framework for determining the admissibility of unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence. The “Collins test” directed judges to consider: 
(1) the effect of admitting the evidence on the fairness of the trial; 
(2) the seriousness of the violation; and 
(3) the effect of exclusion on the repute of the administration of justice. 
Although in his majority opinion Lamer J. (as he then was) charac-
terized this grouping of factors as merely “a matter of personal 
preference”,86 over time the Collins framework acquired a talismanic 
quality. For the next 10 years, the Court engaged in a vigorous debate 
over how the three sets of Collins factors should properly be applied, 
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with judges on all sides seeking to characterize their preferred position as 
the one truest to the spirit of Collins.87 
This debate came to a head in 1997 in Stillman.88 A panel of seven 
justices originally heard Stillman’s appeal, but a re-hearing by the full 
Court was ordered: 
… [i]n view of the importance of the issues raised on the facts of this 
appeal which, in some aspects, invite a re-consideration of established 
principles as regards the application of s. 24(2).89  
The Court expressly invited interveners to participate in the rehear-
ing. Some observers expected the Court to use Stillman as an opportunity 
to substantially change the section 24(2) framework. However, by a 6-3 
majority the Court instead reaffirmed the key principles that had emerged 
in the decade since Collins.  
A central issue in Stillman involved the proper relationship between 
the “trial fairness” branch of the Collins test and the second and third sets 
of Collins factors. The dispute between the Stillman majority and the 
three dissenters turned on two key questions: 
(1) What does it mean for a trial to be “unfair” in the section 24(2) 
context? 
(2) What consequences should flow from a finding that admitting evi-
dence would cause an “unfair” trial?  
These questions are closely intertwined, since the impact on the re-
pute of the administration of justice of allowing an “unfair” trial to 
proceed cannot be measured without understanding the nature of the “un-
fairness”.  
Justice Lamer’s reasons in Collins expressly linked the concept of 
trial fairness to the principle against self-incrimination. He stated that 
when an accused is unconstitutionally “conscripted against himself 
through a confession or other evidence emanating from him”, admitting 
the evidence “would render the trial unfair, for it did not exist prior to the 
violation and it strikes at one of the fundamental tenets of a fair trial, the 
right against self-incrimination”.90 The Stillman majority reaffirmed this 
strong linkage between “trial fairness” and the principle against self-
incrimination, holding (per Cory J.): 
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It has, for a great many years, been considered unfair and indeed unjust 
to seek to convict on the basis of a compelled statement or confession. 
If it was obtained as a result of a breach of the Charter its admission 
would generally tend to render the trial unfair.91  
Although McLachlin J. dissented in Stillman, she agreed with the 
majority on three points: (i) that the “trial fairness” branch of Collins was 
principally concerned with protecting the principle against self-incrimi-
nation; (ii) that this principle is a component of “fundamental justice” in 
section 7 of the Charter; and (iii) that the principle applies both to state-
ments and to otherwise undiscoverable “derivative real evidence” — 
evidence found as a result of a compelled statement.92 However, 
L’Heureux-Dubé J. wrote separate dissenting reasons advocating a nar-
rower conception of “trial fairness”. She would have replaced the Collins 
distinction between “conscriptive” and “non-conscriptive” evidence with 
a distinction between “reliable” and “unreliable” evidence.93  
The main dispute in Stillman was over the consequences that should 
flow from a finding that admitting evidence would offend the principle 
against self-incrimination. Several previous majority judgments had sug-
gested that the “unfairness” caused by admitting compelled self-
incriminatory evidence is so great that “there is no need to consider the 
other factors referred to in Collins, supra”.94 The Stillman majority en-
dorsed this approach, holding that: 
A consideration of trial fairness is of fundamental importance. If after 
careful consideration it is determined that the admission of evidence 
obtained in violation of a Charter right would render a trial unfair then 
the evidence must be excluded without consideration of the other 
Collins factors. A fair trial for those accused of a criminal offence is a 
cornerstone of our Canadian democratic society. A conviction resulting 
from an unfair trial is contrary to our concept of justice. To uphold such 
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a conviction would be unthinkable. It would indeed be a travesty of 
justice. 
. . . . . 
[A] finding that the admission of the evidence would render the trial 
unfair means that the administration of justice would necessarily be 
brought into disrepute if the evidence were not excluded under s. 24(2). 
… The Court, as a general rule, will exclude the evidence without 
considering the seriousness of the breach or the effect of exclusion on 
the repute of the administration of justice. This must be the result since 
an unfair trial would necessarily bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute.95 
Justice Cory emphasized that this did not mean that “conscriptive” 
evidence would automatically be excluded. Rather, he held that admitting 
conscriptive evidence “will generally not render the trial unfair” if the 
Crown can show “that it would have been discovered by alternative 
non-conscriptive means”,96 and that when this burden is met the admissi-
bility of the evidence will depend on the balancing of the second and 
thirds sets of Collins factors. Although critics of the Stillman framework 
sometimes described it as creating an “automatic exclusionary rule” for 
conscriptive evidence, this is incorrect. What Stillman actually estab-
lished was automatic exclusion of evidence that would render the trial 
unfair, in the sense that its admission would violate the principle against 
self-incrimination. 
In her Stillman dissent, McLachlin J. disagreed with the majority on 
this issue. She drew a distinction between trials that merely have “aspects 
of unfairness” and trials that are “fundamentally unfair”, in the sense that 
there is a real “danger that an innocent person may have been con-
victed”.97 In her view, a court that concluded that admitting evidence 
would cause an unfair trial should then balance this unfairness against 
the other Collins factors: 
Depending on the degree of unfairness and countervailing 
circumstances, the fairness of the manner in which the evidence was 
obtained may or may not result in rejection of the evidence under s. 
24(2). In an extreme case, where the unfairness casts doubt on the 
safety of the verdict, it may, as a matter of application of the balancing 
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process, be predicted that the interest in admitting the evidence will 
never outweigh the harm that would be done by its admission.98 
As noted above, L’Heureux-Dubé J. would have narrowed the “trial 
fairness” branch to focus exclusively on concerns about reliability, but 
she indicated that she “[did] not disagree with McLachlin J. and her 
analysis on this point”.99  
A second important area of disagreement between the Stillman ma-
jority and the dissenters was over the scope of the principle against self-
incrimination. Justice Cory, for the majority, extended the definition of 
“conscriptive evidence” to include not only compelled statements and 
derivative evidence, but also evidence obtained through the use of a sus-
pect’s body. Justice McLachlin agreed that statements and derivative 
evidence both engaged the principle against self-incrimination, but dis-
agreed with the majority’s extension of the principle to include bodily 
substances and similar evidence. 
In summary, the Stillman majority treated the principle against self-
incrimination as so fundamentally important that it required evidence to 
be excluded, regardless of other considerations such as the degree of po-
lice fault, the reliability of the evidence and the seriousness of the 
offence. The dissenters, in contrast, contemplated that evidence should 
sometimes be admitted on the strength of these factors even though this 
would render the trial “unfair”, as long as the reliability of the verdict 
was not compromised. The dissenters also disagreed that the principle 
against self-incrimination was engaged by evidence arising from “the 
compelled use of the body”. 
2. The Section 7 Self-Incrimination Jurisprudence 
The evolution of the section 24(2) Collins test leading up to Stillman 
occurred in parallel with another important development in the Charter — 
the recognition of the principle against self-incrimination as a section 7 
principle of fundamental justice. Section 7 comes into play when people 
are lawfully compelled to speak. Section 13 of the Charter protects com-
pellable witnesses100 in “proceedings” from having their testimony used 
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directly as evidence against them, but it does not prevent the prosecution 
from using derivative evidence — that is, evidence found as a result of the 
witnesses’ testimony. In a series of decisions in the 1990s, the Court held 
that section 7 supplements section 13 by barring the self-incriminatory use 
of such derivative evidence, if it was otherwise undiscoverable. Since law-
ful testimonial compulsion does not itself violate the Charter, a compelled 
witness cannot seek to have derivative evidence excluded under section 
24(2), which applies only to evidence that was “obtained in a manner that 
infringed [the Charter]”. However, the Court held that the use of otherwise 
undiscoverable evidence derived from compelled testimony would violate 
the principle against self-incrimination, which the Court recognized to be 
one of the section 7 “principles of fundamental justice”. 
Under the section 7 self-incrimination jurisprudence, undiscoverable 
derivative evidence is excluded to prevent the section 7 Charter breach 
that would be caused by its admission. The section 7 self-incrimination 
cases draw heavily on the Courts’ post-Collins section 24(2) decisions, 
and establish rules under section 7 that deliberately mirror the Court’s 
emerging approach to self-incriminatory evidence under section 24(2), 
which was ultimately reaffirmed in Stillman. Both branches of Charter 
jurisprudence are founded on the same key premise: that it is inherently 
unfair to convict people by compelling them to become witnesses against 
themselves. The section 7 cases take this premise a step further, holding 
that it is not merely unfair but contrary to the principles of fundamental 
justice enshrined in the Charter.  
The Court consciously crafted section 7’s residual protection against 
self-incrimination to dovetail with the Collins/Stillman section 24(2) 
framework, in order to ensure that lawfully compelled speakers receive 
the same protection under section 7 that section 24(2) gives to people 
who are compelled to speak in breach of their Charter rights. In his ma-
jority reasons in R. v. S. (R.J.), Iacobucci J. referred to the section 24(2) 
“trial fairness” cases and held: 
Since it is the principle against self-incrimination which is at stake, and 
since that principle finds recognition under s. 24(2) … we should avoid 
the incongruity which would result if a different quality of protection 
was offered to the witness who is compelled to answer questions. The 
Charter should be construed as a coherent system. Accordingly, I think 
that evidence which could not have been obtained, or the significance 
of which could not have been appreciated, but for the testimony of a 
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witness, ought generally to be excluded under s. 7 of the Charter in the 
interests of trial fairness.101 
Like the section 24(2) “trial fairness” cases, the leading section 7 
self-incrimination decisions were not unanimous. However, the judges on 
both sides of the debate agreed that consistency between sections 7 and 
24(2) was essential. In particular, everyone agreed (i) that if admitting 
certain lawfully obtained evidence would violate the principles of fun-
damental justice, the same evidence must necessarily be excluded under 
section 24(2) when it is obtained unconstitutionally; and (ii) conversely, 
if evidence is routinely admitted under section 24(2), its admission must 
not offend the principles of fundamental justice. As Iacobucci J. ex-
plained in R. v. S. (R.J.): 
If evidence derived from a Charter breach can be admitted on the 
theory that its use will not bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute, how then can it be said that to admit any evidence derived 
from compelled testimony would be contrary to the principles of 
fundamental justice? To make this argument is to suggest, inferentially, 
that the admission of evidence which offends the principles of 
fundamental justice does not bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute. How can this be? As L’Heureux-Dubé J. observed in 
Thomson Newspapers, supra, “[t]o state the question is to answer 
it.”102 
While everyone agreed with this general proposition, different mem-
bers of the Court extracted different conclusions from this. The majority 
decided that sections 7 and 24(2) should both be understood to prohibit 
the admission of otherwise undiscoverable derivative evidence. In con-
trast, L’Heureux-Dubé J. thought that consistency should be achieved by 
making derivative evidence admissible under both regimes. In her con-
currence in R. v. S. (R.J.), she was sharply critical of the majority’s 
decision to model the section 7 standard on the section 24(2) “trial fair-
ness” jurisprudence, declaring that this would “raise serious problems if 
this Court were to modify its approach to s. 24(2)”.103 
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3. The Ontario Court of Appeal’s Decision in Grant 
The Ontario Court of Appeal (per Laskin J.A.) concluded: (i) that 
Mr. Grant had been arbitrarily detained, contrary to section 9 of the Char-
ter; (ii) that his inculpatory admissions were “compelled”; (iii) that the 
gun seized from his person was derivative evidence that the police would 
not have located but for these admissions; and (iv) that admitting the gun 
into evidence would thus render the trial “unfair”.104 However, the On-
tario Court declined to take the next step mandated by Stillman and 
exclude the gun. Justice Laskin justified his refusal to follow Stillman on 
the strength of LeBel J.’s concurring reasons in R. v. Orbanski, which he 
interpreted as implying that evidence rendering a trial unfair “will not 
always bring the administration of justice into disrepute”, and thus need 
not always be excluded.105  
Justice Laskin proposed a new section 24(2) test in which exclusion 
would depend on “the resulting degree of trial unfairness and on the 
strength of the other two Collins factors”.106 He suggested further that the 
degree of trial unfairness should be measured by examining the evi-
dence’s reliability and considering whether it had been obtained by 
“flagrant … abuse”.107 The self-incriminatory character of the evidence 
played little or no role in his proposed analysis. Justice Laskin’s sugges-
tion that “trial unfairness” can be outweighed by other Collins factors if 
it does not affect the reliability of the outcome is directly contrary to the 
majority judgment in Stillman, and closely resembles the views of the 
Stillman dissenters.  
4. The Supreme Court of Canada’s New Section 24(2) Test in Grant 
(a) The Grant Majority’s New Test 
When Grant was heard in April 2008, 11 years after Stillman, none 
of the judges who had constituted the Stillman majority remained on the 
Court. The seven justices108 who heard Grant unanimously decided to 
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adopt a “revised approach” to section 24(2). Six justices agreed on a new 
section 24(2) framework, as set out in the majority reasons written jointly 
by McLachlin C.J.C. and Charron J.109 The Grant majority’s new test 
eliminates the “trial fairness” branch of the Collins test and repackages 
the remaining two sets of Collins factors into a new three-prong test.  
Significantly, the majority characterizes the section 24(2) exclusion-
ary remedy as solely directed at “societal” concerns, stating: 
Section 24(2) is not aimed at punishing the police or providing 
compensation to the accused, but rather at systemic concerns. The s. 
24(2) focus is on the broad impact of admission of the evidence on the 
long-term repute of the justice system.110 
Consistent with this conception of section 24(2)’s purpose, the three 
branches of the Grant majority’s new test emphasize the “message” that 
would be sent by excluding or admitting evidence in a particular case. 
Courts are directed to consider and balance the following three factors: 
(1) the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct (admission 
may send the message the justice system condones serious state 
misconduct), 
(2) the impact of the breach on the Charter-protected interests of the 
accused (admission may send the message that individual rights 
count for little), and 
(3) society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits.111  
According to the majority:  
The court’s role on a s. 24(2) application is to balance the assessments 
under each of these lines of inquiry to determine whether, considering 
all the circumstances, admission of the evidence would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. These concerns, while not 
precisely tracking the categories of considerations set out in Collins, 
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capture the factors relevant to the s. 24(2) determination as enunciated 
in Collins and subsequent jurisprudence.112 
The Chief Justice and Charron J. rejected the Collins/Stillman frame-
work’s emphasis on “trial fairness”, declaring that “‘trial fairness’ in the 
Collins/Stillman sense is no longer a determinative criterion for the s. 
24(2) inquiry”.113 They stated: 
It is difficult to reconcile trial fairness as a multifaceted and contextual 
concept with a near-automatic presumption that admission of a broad 
class of evidence will render a trial unfair, regardless of the 
circumstances in which it was obtained. In our view, trial fairness is 
better conceived as an overarching systemic goal than as a distinct 
stage of the s. 24(2) analysis.114 
Under the new Grant framework, the self-incriminatory character of 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence remains a relevant and weighty 
consideration under the second branch, in which the impact of the breach 
on the accused’s Charter-protected interests is considered. However, it is 
no longer a decisive factor: evidence will sometimes be admissible even 
if its admission offends the principle against self-incrimination.  
The Grant majority goes on to discuss how the different categories 
of evidence established by the Collins/Stillman framework115 should be 
analyzed under its new test. A recurring theme in the majority’s judgment 
is that appeal courts should defer to trial courts’ weighing of the relevant 
factors:  
In all cases, it is the task of the trial judge to weigh the various 
indications. No overarching rule governs how the balance is to be 
struck. Mathematical precision is obviously not possible. However, the 
preceding analysis creates a decision tree, albeit more flexible than the 
Stillman self-incrimination test. We believe this to be required by the 
words of s. 24(2). We also take comfort in the fact that patterns emerge 
with respect to particular types of evidence. These patterns serve as 
guides to judges faced with s. 24(2) applications in future cases. In this 
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way, a measure of certainty is achieved. Where the trial judge has 
considered the proper factors, appellate courts should accord 
considerable deference to his or her ultimate determination.116 
(b) Application of the New Grant Test to Particular Types of Evidence 
(i) Statements 
The Grant majority suggests that under its new test, unconstitution-
ally obtained statements will be subject to a “presumptive general, 
although not automatic”117 rule of exclusion. Chief Justice McLachlin 
and Charron J. state: 
[T]he heightened concern with proper police conduct in obtaining 
statements from suspects and the centrality of the protected interests 
affected will in most cases favour exclusion of statements taken in 
breach of the Charter, while the third factor, obtaining a decision on 
the merits, may be attenuated by lack of reliability. This, together with 
the common law’s historic tendency to treat statements of the accused 
differently from other evidence, explains why such statements tend to 
be excluded under s. 24(2).118 
However, the majority suggests that a statement may still be admis-
sible under its new test in certain narrow circumstances, such as if it was 
made following a “technically defective” section 10(b) caution that nev-
ertheless “clearly informed [the suspect] of his or her choice to speak to 
the police”.119 
(ii) Derivative Evidence 
The Collins/Stillman framework and the section 7 self-incrimination 
jurisprudence both treat otherwise undiscoverable evidence derived from 
statements as essentially indistinguishable from the statements them-
selves. The Grant majority, however, holds that otherwise undiscoverable 
derivative evidence can now be admitted even in circumstances where 
the statement itself should be excluded. Under the majority’s new  
approach, the undiscoverability of derivative evidence is no longer  
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dispositive under section 24(2), although it remains a relevant factor 
when assessing the impact of the Charter breach on the accused’s pro-
tected interests (the second branch of the new Grant test). Further, since 
under the Stillman framework the Crown bore the burden of establishing 
on a balance of probabilities that the police would have found the evi-
dence by other, non-conscriptive means,120 any uncertainty on this 
question was resolved in favour of the accused. In contrast, the Grant 
majority states that “in cases where it cannot be determined with any 
confidence whether evidence would have been discovered in absence of 
the statement, discoverability will have no impact on the section 24(2) 
inquiry”.121 
The Grant majority notes that when the accused’s interest in making 
a free and informed decision about whether or not to speak is “signifi-
cantly compromised” by the Charter breach, this will be a factor 
“strongly favour[ing] exclusion”.122 On the other hand, since physical 
derivative evidence will generally not raise reliability concerns, “the pub-
lic interest in having a trial adjudicated on the merits will usually favour 
admission of the derivative evidence”.123 The majority concludes: 
 The weighing process and balancing of these concerns is one for 
the trial judge in each case. Provided the judge has considered the 
correct factors, considerable deference should be accorded to his or her 
decision. As a general rule, however, it can be ventured that where 
reliable evidence is discovered as a result of a good faith infringement 
that did not greatly undermine the accused’s protected interests, the 
trial judge may conclude that it should be admitted under s. 24(2). On 
the other hand, deliberate and egregious police conduct that severely 
impacted the accused’s protected interests may result in exclusion, 
notwithstanding that the evidence may be reliable. 
 The s. 24(2) judge must remain sensitive to the concern that a more 
flexible rule may encourage police to improperly obtain statements that 
they know will be inadmissible, in order to find derivative evidence 
which they believe may be admissible. The judge should refuse to 
admit evidence where there is reason to believe the police deliberately 
abused their power to obtain a statement which might lead them to such 
evidence. Where derivative evidence is obtained by way of a deliberate 
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or flagrant Charter breach, its admission would bring the administration 
of justice into further disrepute and the evidence should be excluded.124 
On the facts of Grant itself, the majority found that the impact of the 
breach on Mr. Grant’s Charter interests “was significant”. On the other 
hand, the reliability of the gun as evidence favoured its admission. The 
seriousness of the offence cut both ways — while it increased the socie-
tal importance of the prosecution, it also made it “all the more important 
that [Mr. Grant’s] rights be respected”. Accordingly, the majority found 
this factor to “not … be of much assistance”.125 Ultimately, the majority 
concluded that while this was a “close case”, the fact that the police had 
been “operating in circumstances of considerable legal uncertainty … 
tips the balance in favour of admission”. The majority noted: 
We add that the Court’s decision in this case will be to [sic] render 
similar conduct less justifiable going forward. While police are not 
expected to engage in judicial reflection on conflicting precedents, they 
are rightly expected to know what the law is.126 
(iii) Bodily Substances, etc. 
The Stillman majority had held that evidence obtained unlawfully 
through the use of a suspect’s body, including seized bodily substances, 
engaged the principle against self-incrimination as much as statements 
and derivative evidence. Justice Cory stated: 
It is repugnant to fair-minded men and women to think that police can 
without consent or statutory authority take or require an accused to 
provide parts of their body or bodily substances in order to incriminate 
themselves. The recognition of the right to bodily integrity and sanctity 
is embodied in s. 7 of the Charter which confirms the right to life, 
liberty and the security of the person and guarantees the equally 
important reciprocal right not to be deprived of security of the person 
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. This 
right requires that any interference with or intrusion upon the human 
body can only be undertaken in accordance with principles of 
fundamental justice. Generally that will require valid statutory authority 
or the consent of the individual to the particular bodily intrusion or 
interference required for the purpose of the particular procedure the 
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police wish to undertake. It follows that the compelled use of the body 
or the compelled provision of bodily substances in breach of a Charter 
right for purposes of self-incrimination will generally result in an unfair 
trial just as surely as the compelled or conscripted self-incriminating 
statement.127 
Chief Justice McLachlin had disagreed with this analysis in her 
Stillman dissent. Likewise, in Grant she and Charron J. reject it as un-
sound: 
[A] simple conscription test for the admissibility of bodily evidence 
under s. 24(2) … wrongly equates bodily evidence with statements 
taken from the accused. In most situations, statements and bodily 
samples raise very different considerations from the point of view of 
the administration of justice. Equating them under the umbrella of 
conscription risks erasing relevant distinctions and compromising the 
ultimate analysis of systemic disrepute. As Professor Paciocco has 
observed, “in equating intimate bodily substances with testimony we 
are not so much reacting to the compelled participation of the accused 
as we are to the violation of the privacy and dignity of the person that 
obtaining such evidence involves”.128 … Nor does the taking of a 
bodily sample trench on the accused’s autonomy in the same way as 
may the unlawful taking of a statement. The pre-trial right to silence 
under s. 7, the right against testimonial self-incrimination in s. 11(c), 
and the right against subsequent use of self-incriminating evidence in s. 
13 have informed the treatment of statements under s. 24(2). These 
concepts do not apply coherently to bodily samples, which are not 
communicative in nature, weakening self-incrimination as the sole 
criterion for determining their admissibility.129 
Accordingly, the Grant majority directs courts to determine the ad-
missibility of seized bodily substances under its new analytical 
framework by examining, under the second branch, “the degree to which 
the search and seizure intruded upon the privacy, bodily integrity and 
human dignity of the accused”. The majority concludes: 
While each case must be considered on its own facts, it may be 
ventured in general that where an intrusion on bodily integrity is 
deliberately inflicted and the impact on the accused’s privacy, bodily 
integrity and dignity is high, bodily evidence will be excluded, 
                                                                                                             
127
 Stillman, supra, note 3, at para. 89. 
128
 D. Paciocco, “Stillman, Disproportion and the Fair Trial Dichotomy” (1997) 2 Can. Crim. 
L.R. 163, at 170. 
129
 Grant, supra, note 1, at para. 105 
420 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
notwithstanding its relevance and reliability. On the other hand, where 
the violation is less egregious and the intrusion is less severe in terms 
of privacy, bodily integrity and dignity, reliable evidence obtained from 
the accused’s body may be admitted. For example, this will often be the 
case with breath sample evidence, whose method of collection is 
relatively non-intrusive.130 
5. Analysis 
(a) Grant’s Impact on the Principle against Self-incrimination and Stare 
Decisis 
The Grant majority’s repudiation of the Collins/Stillman section 
24(2) framework has profound practical and theoretical implications. On 
the level of constitutional theory, Grant raises serious questions about the 
continued validity of the Court’s section 7 self-incrimination jurispru-
dence, which was deliberately crafted to be consistent with the now-
abandoned Collins/Stillman section 24(2) framework. The underlying 
premise of the section 7 self-incrimination cases is that it is fundamen-
tally unjust to admit otherwise undiscoverable evidence derived from the 
accused’s compelled statements, and that this evidence must therefore be 
excluded to avoid the section 7 Charter breach its admission would 
cause. Although some of the early section 7 cases suggested that the 
power to exclude derivative evidence was “discretionary”, the section 7 
jurisprudence as a whole, particularly the more recent cases, makes clear 
that this “discretion” is limited to the factual issue whether a particular 
piece of derivative evidence was otherwise discoverable.131 There is no 
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suggestion in the section 7 cases that otherwise undiscoverable derivative 
evidence can be admitted because of the public importance in securing a 
conviction in a particular prosecution.132 Rather, the key principle ani-
mating the section 7 cases is that a conviction so obtained would be 
contrary to the principles of fundamental justice. The “principles of fun-
damental justice” are, by definition, “fundamental”: they cannot 
routinely be overridden by other considerations, including society’s in-
terest in punishing wrongdoers.133 Under the existing section 7 
jurisprudence, if Mr. Grant had been lawfully compelled to testify and 
had revealed that there was an illegal gun in his apartment, the gun 
plainly could not have been admitted as evidence against him in any sub-
sequent prosecution if it was not independently discoverable. Under the 
Collins/Stillman approach, the gun would also have been excluded when, 
as here, he revealed its existence and location as a consequence of 
unlawful and unconstitutional coercion.134 The majority decision in 
Grant destroys this symmetry, and leads to the perverse result that de-
rivative evidence that is inadmissible when it is obtained lawfully now 
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becomes potentially admissible when it is obtained in violation of the 
Charter. This is an incoherent and fundamentally untenable position.  
The Grant majority does not grapple with the implications its deci-
sion has for the Court’s existing section 7 self-incrimination 
jurisprudence. Rather, it avoids addressing the issue squarely by asserting 
that the impact of admission on “trial fairness” simply need no longer be 
considered under section 24(2). However, this simply sweeps the issue 
under the carpet. To adopt the words of Iacobucci J. in R. v. S. (R.J.), 
quoted previously, the Grant majority judgment: 
 … suggest[s], inferentially, that the admission of evidence which 
offends the principles of fundamental justice does not bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. How can this be? As 
L’Heureux-Dubé J. observed in Thomson Newspapers, supra, “[t]o 
state the question is to answer it.”135  
If evidence that offends the principle against self-incrimination is 
now routinely admissible under section 24(2), this principle cannot really 
be as fundamental as the section 7 self-incrimination cases suppose. De-
spite the Grant majority’s assertion that it did not wish to “undermin[e] 
the principles that animate the jurisprudence to date”,136 its repudiation of 
the Collins/Stillman framework inevitably has this effect. In the coming 
years, prosecutors, may begin training their sights on the parallel section 
7 exclusionary rule established in R. v. S. (R.J.), British Columbia (Secu-
rities Commission) v. Branch,137 R. v. White138 and R. v. Jarvis139 and 
arguing that this Charter doctrine should also now be reconsidered in 
light of Grant. 
Even leaving aside Grant’s impact on section 7 of the Charter, the 
Court’s decision to sweep away 20 years of settled section 24(2) juris-
prudence is virtually unprecedented. The Court has previously stated that 
“[t]here must be compelling circumstances to justify departure from a 
prior decision”140 and declared that it “should be particularly careful be-
fore reversing a precedent where the effect is to diminish Charter 
protection”.141 It is therefore surprising for the Court to overturn Collins 
and Stillman — both watershed judgments in the history of the Charter 
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— without any mention of the principle of stare decisis. The Grant ma-
jority gives only a perfunctory explanation of what it sees as wrong with 
the Stillman majority’s approach, and does not address the broader impli-
cations of a majority of the current Court simply substituting their views 
for those of the Stillman majority. Whatever else might be said about 
Stillman, it was an extremely carefully considered decision. When it was 
decided in 1997, the debate over section 24(2) had been going on for 10 
years, and the main criticisms and arguments against the Collins/Stillman 
approach were well known and fully canvassed. All that has changed in 
the past 10 years is the composition of the Court. 
Although the Grant majority relies to some degree on pragmatic ar-
guments — such as its contention that the Collins/Stillman “discover-
ability” test has “proved difficult to apply” in practice “because of its 
hypothetical nature” and “fine-grained distinctions” — its disagreement 
with the Stillman majority is ultimately a dispute over fundamental con-
stitutional principles. The Stillman majority’s approach to section 24(2) 
flows directly from its conception of the principle against self-
incrimination, and its belief that a conviction obtained by violating this 
principle would be “unthinkable” and “a travesty of justice”.142 The 
Grant majority evidently sees nothing wrong with allowing at least some 
convictions to be based on compelled and otherwise undiscoverable self-
incriminatory evidence. What is missing from its analysis is a cogent ar-
ticulation of why something previously declared to be “unthinkable” 
should now be seen as acceptable. Likewise, the Grant majority does not 
explain why it is appropriate for the Court to suddenly change the foun-
dational principles on which much of its Charter jurisprudence over the 
past 20 years is based. 
(b) Practical Implications of Grant and Harrison in Future Section 24(2) 
Cases 
(i) Conscriptive Evidence 
The most significant and immediate practical implication of Grant 
is that much “conscriptive” evidence that would have been excluded 
under the Collins/Stillman “trial fairness” branch will now be admitted 
under the Court’s new discretionary balancing test. While trial courts 
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will likely continue to exclude most unconstitutionally obtained state-
ments, it will now be much easier for prosecutors to obtain admission 
of derivative evidence. In terms of the sheer number of cases affected, 
the most significant impact will be on cases involving seized bodily 
substances, including breath samples.143 Admission of this type of evi-
dence is likely to become the norm, with exclusion being reserved for 
cases involving exceptionally invasive searches or especially egregious 
police misconduct.  
The early returns support these predictions. Lower courts have regu-
larly followed Grant’s suggestion that breath samples should generally 
be excluded only when the police misconduct is egregious.144 On the 
other hand, unconstitutionally obtained self-incriminatory statements 
have continued to be excluded under the Grant framework.145 Derivative 
evidence found as a result of inculpatory statements made by detainees to 
the police has also been excluded in several post-Grant cases, but in cir-
                                                                                                             
143
 In the case of breath samples, Grant renders moot the post-Stillman debate over the 
meaning of Cory J.’s cryptic obiter comments at para. 90 of his majority reasons, which could be 
read in several different ways: (i) as creating an exception to the general rule in Stillman that admit-
ting unconstitutionally obtained bodily substances would render the trial unfair (see, e.g., R. v. Scott, 
[2001] O.J. No. 853, 10 M.V.R. (4th) 302, at para. 28 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Skuse, [2004] O.J. No. 
2726, 2004 ONCJ 91 (Ont. C.J.)); (ii) as creating an exception to the general rule in Stillman that 
evidence that would render a trial unfair must be excluded (see, e.g., R. v. Mastromartino, [2004] 
O.J. No. 1435, 70 O.R. (3d) 540, at paras. 36-38, 67 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Soal, [2005] O.J. No. 319, 
2005 CanLII 2323, at paras. 35-36 (Ont. S.C.J.)); or (iii) as an attempt to explain why statutes au-
thorizing the warrantless seizure of breath samples and fingerprints are constitutional (see, e.g., R. v. 
Shepherd, [2007] S.J. No. 119, 2007 SKCA 29, at paras. 68-118 (Sask. C.A.), per Smith J.A., dis-
senting; R. v. McKenzie, 1999 CanLII 14904, at paras. 15-17 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Carroll, [2002] O.J. 
No. 1215, 24 M.V.R. (4th) 248, at paras. 16-19 (Ont. C.J.); R. v. Schaeffer, [2005] S.J. No. 144, 194 
C.C.C. (3d) 517, at paras. 50-58 (Sask. C.A.)).  
144
 See, e.g., R. v. Fildan, [2009] O.J. No. 3604, 201 C.R.R. (2d) 12 (Ont S.C.J.); R. v. Bryce, 
[2009] O.J. No. 3640, 2009 CanLII 45842 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Du, [2009] O.J. No. 3194, 2009 
CanLII 39783 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Neff, [2009] O.J. No. 3873, 2009 ONCJ 436 (Ont. C.J.); R. v. Vi-
noharan, [2009] O.J. No. 4037 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. White, [2009] B.C.J. No. 2050, 2009 BCPC 312 
(B.C. Prov. Ct.); R. v. Howell, [2009] A.J. No. 1042, 2009 ABPC 276 (Alta. Prov. Ct.); R. v. Rusnak, 
[2009] A.J. No. 970, 2009 ABPC 258 (Alta. Prov. Ct.); R. v. Kimmel, [2009] A.J. No. 1080, 2009 
ABPC 289 (Alta. Prov. Ct.); R. v. Tooke, [2009] A.J. No. 1081, 2009 ABPC 292 (Alta. Prov. Ct.); R. 
v. Hennigar, [2009] N.S.J. No. 417, 2009 NSPC 42 (N.S. Prov. Ct.). In some of these cases the court 
found no Charter breach but indicated that it would have admitted the breath samples under s. 24(2) 
in any event. However, breath samples were excluded in R. v. Beattie, [2009] O.J. No. 4121, 2009 
ONCJ 456 (Ont. C.J.), based on the court’s concern about the long-term impact of condoning police 
disregard for the statutory time requirements for conducting roadside screening tests, and in R. v. 
Sergalis, [2009] O.J. No. 4823, 90 M.V.R. (5th) 116 (Ont. S.C.J), based on a finding that the officer 
knew or should have known that he had no legal basis to initially detain the defendant.  
145
 See, e.g., R. v. Whyte, [2009] O.J. No. 3557, 2009 ONCJ 389 (Ont. C.J.); R. v. Comber, 
[2009] O.J. No. 3854, 2009 ONCJ 418 (Ont. C.J.). 
(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d)  CHARTER DETENTION AND THE EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE 425 
cumstances where the court characterized the police misconduct as seri-
ous.146  
(ii) Non-Conscriptive Evidence 
The impact of Grant and Harrison on the admissibility of evidence 
that would previously have been classified as “non-conscriptive” or as 
“conscriptive but discoverable” is likely to be more subtle. Under the 
Collins/Stillman approach, the admissibility of this type of evidence was 
determined by balancing the second and third sets of Collins factors. The 
second set of Collins factors, relating to the “seriousness of the viola-
tion”, actually involved two analytically distinct considerations. Some 
breaches are “serious” because of the gravity of their impact on the sus-
pect’s protected Charter interests, while others are “serious” because they 
demonstrate a blatant police disregard for, or ignorance of, the Charter and 
the limits on their powers. Breaches are often “serious” in one sense but 
not the other. The new Grant test directs judges to address these two dif-
ferent considerations separately, which should promote analytic clarity. 
The Grant majority emphasizes that applying its new test to individual 
cases will be a highly fact-specific exercise. However, the conclusions 
reached by the Court on the facts of Grant and Harrison and in a subse-
quent decision, R. v. Morelli,147 are instructive. As discussed above, in 
Grant the Court ultimately admitted the evidence, but described it as a 
“close case”, in which the uncertainty surrounding the law of detention 
tipped the balance in favour of admission. Significantly, the Court treats 
the public safety concerns associated with gun crimes as important, but not 
necessarily dispositive. Grant thus may be helpful in rebutting the sugges-
tion that has sometimes been made in the past that there should be near-
automatic inclusion of guns under section 24(2). Further, the Court’s shift 
in focus away from self-incrimination as the predominant section 24(2) 
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factor, and the renewed emphasis placed on police misconduct, may make 
it easier to have guns excluded in cases where the police deliberately or 
negligently disregard the Charter, even when the principle against self-
incrimination is not engaged (for instance, when the police unlawfully de-
tain and search a suspect with insufficient grounds, but do not elicit a self-
incriminatory statement). 
The Court’s application of its new test to the facts of Harrison is par-
ticularly important. The officer in Harrison pulled over the accused’s 
rented vehicle for specious reasons,148 and proceeded to search some 
sealed boxes in the cargo area, ostensibly in order to look for the ac-
cused’s driver’s licence. The boxes turned out to contain 35 kilograms of 
cocaine. The trial judge found that the officer had committed “brazen and 
flagrant” Charter violations, and that his evidence was “contrived and 
def[ied] credibility”. Nevertheless, he admitted the evidence, essentially 
on the grounds that the Charter breaches “pale in comparison to the 
criminality involved” in transporting large quantities of cocaine. A 2-1 
majority149 of the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld this decision, empha-
sizing that the officer’s misconduct “was not shown to be systemic in 
nature”150 and that the accused’s “privacy interest in the car was low”.151 
By a 6-1 majority,152 the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the evi-
dence should have been excluded. On the first prong of the new Grant test 
— the “seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct” — the major-
ity agreed with the trial judge that the breaches were serious, stating: 
The officer’s determination to turn up incriminating evidence blinded 
him to constitutional requirements of reasonable grounds. While the 
violations may not have been “deliberate”, in the sense of setting out to 
breach the Charter, they were reckless and showed an insufficient 
regard for Charter rights. Exacerbating the situation, the departure from 
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Charter standards was major in degree, since reasonable grounds for 
the initial stop were entirely non-existent.153 
Chief Justice McLachlin noted that “while evidence of a systemic 
problem can properly aggravate the seriousness of the breach and weigh 
in favour of exclusion, the absence of such a problem is hardly a mitigat-
ing factor”.154 She also held that the officer’s misleading testimony (as 
found by the trial judge): 
While not part of the Charter breach itself … is properly a factor to 
consider as part of the first inquiry under the s. 24(2) analysis given the 
need for a court to dissociate itself from such behaviour. As Cronk J.A. 
observed [in her dissent in the Ontario Court of Appeal] “the integrity 
of the judicial system and the truth-seeking function of the courts lie at 
the heart of the admissibility inquiry envisaged under s. 24(2) of the 
Charter. Few actions more directly undermine both of these goals than 
misleading testimony in court from persons in authority”.155 
The Harrison majority’s confirmation that police misconduct on the 
witness stand can strengthen the case for exclusion is an important devel-
opment in the section 24(2) jurisprudence. The Chief Justice concluded: 
In sum, the conduct of the police that led to the Charter breaches in this 
case represented a blatant disregard for Charter rights. This disregard 
for Charter rights was aggravated by the officer’s misleading testimony 
at trial. The police conduct was serious, and not lightly to be 
condoned.156 
Turning to the second branch of the new Grant test — the impact of 
the Charter breach on the accused’s Charter-protected interests — the 
majority disagreed with the Court of Appeal majority’s holding “that the 
effects of the breaches on [Harrison’s] rights … were relatively minor”. 
Rather, McLachlin C.J.C. stated: 
[B]eing stopped and subjected to a search by the police without 
justification impacts on the motorist’s rightful expectation of liberty 
and privacy in a way that is much more than trivial.157 
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She concluded that “the deprivation of liberty and privacy repre-
sented by the unconstitutional detention and search was therefore a 
significant, although not egregious, intrusion on the appellant’s Charter-
protected interests.” This holding may help to counter the troubling ten-
dency in some lower courts to treat motorists’ privacy interest in their 
vehicles as not merely “reduced” in comparison to the high privacy in-
terest associated with a home or office, but as insignificant and unworthy 
of much consideration.158 
On the third branch of the Grant test — “society’s interest in an ad-
judication on the merits” — the Chief Justice noted that the charges were 
serious, that the seized cocaine was reliable evidence that was essential 
to the Crown’s case. However, she cautioned that the seriousness of the 
offence “must not take on disproportionate significance” in the balancing 
analysis.159 
Chief Justice McLachlin concluded: 
The police conduct in stopping and searching the appellant’s vehicle 
without any semblance of reasonable grounds was reprehensible, and 
was aggravated by the officer’s misleading testimony in court. The 
Charter infringements had a significant, although not egregious, impact 
on the Charter-protected interests of the appellant. These factors favour 
exclusion, the former more strongly than the latter. On the other hand, 
the drugs seized constitute highly reliable evidence tendered on a very 
serious charge, albeit not one of the most serious known to our criminal 
law. This factor weighs in favour of admission. 
 The balancing exercise mandated by s. 24(2) is a qualitative one, 
not capable of mathematical precision. It is not simply a question of 
whether the majority of the relevant factors favour exclusion in a 
particular case. The evidence on each line of inquiry must be weighed 
in the balance, to determine whether, having regard to all the 
circumstances, admission of the evidence would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. Dissociation of the justice 
system from police misconduct does not always trump the truth-seeking 
interests of the criminal justice system. Nor is the converse true. In all 
cases, it is the long-term repute of the administration of justice that 
must be assessed.160 
In her opinion, the trial judge had erred by overemphasizing the third 
set of Grant factors and underemphasizing the first set, thereby “trans-
                                                                                                             
158
 See, e.g., R. v. Alkins, [2007] O.J. No. 1348, 218 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at para. 40 (Ont. C.A.). 
159
 Harrison, supra, note 1, at para. 34. 
160
 Id., at paras. 35-36. 
(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d)  CHARTER DETENTION AND THE EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE 429 
form[ing] the s. 24(2) analysis into a simple contest between the degree 
of the police misconduct and the seriousness of the offence”. She con-
cluded:  
The police misconduct [in Harrison] was serious; indeed, the trial 
judge found that it represented a “brazen and flagrant” disregard of the 
Charter. To appear to condone wilful and flagrant Charter breaches that 
constituted a significant incursion on the appellant’s rights does not 
enhance the long-term repute of the administration of justice; on the 
contrary, it undermines it. In this case, the seriousness of the offence 
and the reliability of the evidence, while important, do not outweigh the 
factors pointing to exclusion.  
 As Cronk J.A. put it [in her dissent in the Court of Appeal], 
allowing the seriousness of the offence and the reliability of the 
evidence to overwhelm the s. 24(2) analysis “would deprive those 
charged with serious crimes of the protection of the individual 
freedoms afforded to all Canadians under the Charter and, in effect, 
declare that in the administration of the criminal law ‘the ends justify 
the means’”(para. 150). Charter protections must be construed so as to 
apply to everyone, even those alleged to have committed the most 
serious criminal offences. … [T]he trial judge seemed to imply that 
where the evidence is reliable and the charge is serious, admission will 
always be the result. As Grant makes clear, this is not the law. 
 Additionally, the trial judge’s observation that the Charter breaches 
“pale in comparison to the criminality involved” in drug trafficking 
risked the appearance of turning the s. 24(2) inquiry into a contest 
between the misdeeds of the police and those of the accused. The fact 
that a Charter breach is less heinous than the offence charged does not 
advance the inquiry mandated by s. 24(2). We expect police to adhere 
to higher standards than alleged criminals.  
 In summary, the price paid by society for an acquittal in these 
circumstances is outweighed by the importance of maintaining Charter 
standards. That being the case, the admission of the cocaine into 
evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. It 
should have been excluded.161 
The Court had a further occasion to apply its new section 24(2) 
framework in R. v. Morelli, decided in March 2010, eight months after 
the release of Grant and Harrison. The police in Morelli obtained a 
search warrant to enter the defendant’s home and seize his computer in 
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order to search for child pornography images. Writing for the majority,162 
Fish J. found that the information to obtain the search warrant contained 
a number of false and misleading assertions and material omissions, and 
that the “amplified” record did not provide sufficient grounds to support 
the issuance of the warrant. Accordingly, the search executed pursuant to 
the invalid warrant violated section 8 of the Charter. Turning to section 
24(2), Fish J. accepted the trial judge’s finding that the drafting errors in 
the search warrant information were unintentional. He noted further that 
the executing officers believed they were acting pursuant to a valid war-
rant and thus “did not wilfully or even negligently breach the Charter”, 
which “favour[ed] admission of the evidence”.163 On the other hand, he 
found that “the officer who prepared the ITO was neither reasonably 
diligent nor mindful of his duty to make full and frank disclosure. At 
best, the ITO was improvidently and carelessly drafted”.164 On balance, 
Fish J. concluded that the first set of Grant factors favoured exclusion: 
 The repute of the administration of justice is jeopardized by 
judicial indifference to unacceptable police conduct. Police officers 
seeking search warrants are bound to act with diligence and integrity, 
taking care to discharge the special duties of candour and full 
disclosure that attach in ex parte proceedings. In discharging those 
duties responsibly, they must guard against making statements that are 
likely to mislead the justice of the peace. They must refrain from 
concealing or omitting relevant facts. And they must take care not to 
otherwise exaggerate the information upon which they rely to establish 
reasonable and probable grounds for issuance of a search warrant.  
 We are bound to accept the trial judge’s finding that there was no 
deliberate misconduct on the part of the officer who swore the 
Information. The repute of the administration of justice would 
nonetheless be significantly eroded, particularly in the long term, if 
such unacceptable police conduct were permitted to form the basis for 
so intrusive an invasion of privacy as the search of our homes and the 
seizure and scrutiny of our personal computers.165 
Turning to the second set of Grant factors, Fish J. emphasized the 
extremely high privacy interest attaching to the contents of one’s per-
sonal computer, stating: 
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[I]t is difficult to imagine a more intrusive invasion of privacy than the 
search of one’s home and personal computer. Computers often contain 
our most intimate correspondence. They contain the details of our 
financial, medical, and personal situations. They even reveal our 
specific interests, likes, and propensities, recording in the browsing 
history and cache files the information we seek out and read, watch, or 
listen to on the Internet.  
It is therefore difficult to conceive a s. 8 breach with a greater impact 
on the Charter-protected privacy interests of the accused than occurred 
in this case.166 
With respect to the third set of Grant factors, Fish J. noted that ex-
cluding the seized evidence would leave the Crown with no case and 
would “seriously undermine the truth-seeking function of the trial” — a 
factor favouring admission.167 Nevertheless, he concluded:  
[W]e are required by Grant to bear in mind the long-term and 
prospective repute of the administration of justice, focussing less on the 
particular case than on the impact over time of admitting the evidence 
obtained by infringement of the constitutionally protected rights of the 
accused.  
 In my view, the repute of the administration of justice will be 
significantly undermined if criminal trials are permitted to proceed on 
the strength of evidence obtained from the most private “place” in the 
home on the basis of misleading, inaccurate, and incomplete 
Informations upon which a search warrant was issued.  
 Justice is blind in the sense that it pays no heed to the social status 
or personal characteristics of the litigants. But justice receives a black 
eye when it turns a blind eye to unconstitutional searches and seizures 
as a result of unacceptable police conduct or practices.  
 The public must have confidence that invasions of privacy are 
justified, in advance, by a genuine showing of probable cause. To admit 
the evidence in this case and similar cases in the future would 
undermine that confidence in the long term.168 
Accordingly, the evidence was excluded and Morelli was acquitted. 
A review of post-Grant lower court section 24(2) decisions suggests 
that although the new Grant test does not radically change the substance 
of the second and third branches of the Collins/Stillman framework, the 
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reorganization of the relevant factors is encouraging courts to place re-
newed emphasis on the egregiousness of the police misconduct when 
deciding whether or not to exclude evidence. In a significant Ontario 
post-Grant decision, R. v. Blake, the Ontario Court of Appeal described 
Grant as having “[taken] a judicial wire brush to the 20 years of juris-
prudential gloss that had built up around s. 24(2) and scrubbed down to 
the bare words of the section”.169 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that 
“in the circumstances of this case the application of Grant yields the 
same result as did the application of Collins”170 (namely, admission of 
the evidence). The police in Blake obtained a warrant to search a dwell-
ing house, primarily on the strength of a tip from a confidential 
informant. Drugs were seized during the search. At trial (conducted prior 
to the release of Grant) the Crown invoked confidential informant privi-
lege and elected to defend the search on the basis of a heavily redacted 
version of the search warrant information. The defence did not challenge 
the Crown’s assertion of privilege, but argued that the redacted informa-
tion disclosed insufficient grounds to support the issuance of the warrant. 
The trial judge agreed and found a section 8 Charter breach, but admitted 
the seized evidence under section 24(2). The Ontario Court of Appeal 
upheld this decision,171 emphasizing that the police had acted in good 
faith throughout. Writing for the Court, Doherty J.A. stated: 
Not only do I agree with the trial judge’s finding of good faith on the 
part of the investigators, I can see no possible criticism of the police 
conduct on this trial record. Throughout the process that culminated in 
the seizure of the evidence, they acted exactly as they were obligated to 
under the law. They were required to obtain a warrant before entering 
the residence. They did so. They were required to make full disclosure 
to the justice of the peace. There is no suggestion that they did not do 
so. The police, and later the Crown, were legally obligated to protect 
the identity of the confidential informants by removing all material 
from the information that could identify the informants before making 
that material available to the defence. They did that. Given the manner 
in which the s. 8 claim was litigated, the police acted not only in good 
faith, but as required by the law. The police conduct in this case does 
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not fit anywhere on the misconduct continuum described in Grant, at 
para. 74.172 
Although the interference with the defendant’s Charter rights occa-
sioned by the search of his home was “very serious”,173 the seized 
evidence “was entirely reliable and essential to the Crown’s case”.174 On 
balance, Doherty J.A. concluded that the three Grant factors favoured 
admitting the evidence: 
 Having conducted the inquiries mandated by Grant, examined the 
application of those inquiries to non-bodily physical evidence in Grant 
(paras. 112-115) and its companion case, R. v. Harrison … I would 
hold that the nature of the state conduct and society’s interest in an 
adjudication on the merits militate strongly in favour of admitting the 
evidence. The impact on the appellant’s s. 8 rights points strongly 
toward exclusion. How does one balance these directly conflicting 
assessments? Without diminishing the important negative impact on the 
appellant’s legitimate privacy interests occasioned by the unreasonable 
search, I find compelling the argument that the exclusion of reliable 
crucial evidence in circumstances where the propriety of the police 
conduct stands unchallenged would, viewed reasonably and from a 
long-term perspective, have a negative effect on the repute of the 
administration of justice.  
 Absent any claim of police misconduct or negligence in the 
obtaining of the initial search warrant, and absent any attempt to go 
behind the redacted information, it would be inappropriate to proceed 
on any basis other than that the police conducted themselves in 
accordance with the applicable legal rules. If there were a taint of 
impropriety, or even inattention to constitutional standards, to be found 
in the police conduct, that might well be enough to tip the scales in 
favour of exclusion, given the very deleterious effect on the accused’s 
legitimate privacy interests. I can see none. The evidence is admissible 
under the approach to s. 24(2) set out in Grant.175  
Blake suggests that even when a privilege-redacted search warrant 
information is vulnerable to a facial attack, defence counsel will now be 
well advised to attempt a further sub-facial attack in order to rebut the 
inference of police good faith, even though it will often be extremely 
difficult to identify any concrete basis for such an attack in a case where 
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the underlying facts are shielded behind a virtually impregnable wall of 
confidential informant privilege.176 When the good faith of the police 
cannot be impugned, courts are likely to treat the second and third Grant 
factors as balancing out and decide cases on the basis that the first Grant 
factor favours admission. 
Although post-Grant decisions in which the police are found to have 
acted in good faith have generally resulted in unconstitutionally obtained 
“real” evidence being admitted177 (with some exceptions178), evidence has 
often been excluded when the police have been found to have violated the 
Charter deliberately or negligently, or displayed an unreasonable ignorance 
of their Charter obligations.179 Morelli, discussed above, is one such case. 
A further example is R. v. Sandhu,180 where Quigley J. of the Ontario Su-
perior Court excluded a very large amount of cocaine seized from a 
tractor-trailer — 205 kilograms, almost six times larger than the quantity at 
issue in Harrison — after finding that the police knew they were violating 
the Charter but went ahead and searched the truck anyway. In several other 
cases courts have followed Morelli and excluded evidence when a search 
warrant has been obtained on the strength of a carelessly drafted, mislead-
ing or materially incomplete information to obtain, even when the errors 
and omissions are not found to have been deliberate.181  
However, the Grant section 24(2) test gives trial judges considerable 
discretion, and the Grant majority repeatedly emphasizes that trial deci-
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sions should be given “considerable” appellate deference.182 The Grant 
framework is sufficiently flexible to permit trial judges to admit evidence 
even in the face of police carelessness, or worse. This point is well illus-
trated by a recent Ontario trial decision, R. v. Little.183 The defendant’s 
employer gave the police permission to go to the defendant’s workplace 
desk and seize his work computer. While doing so, however, they looked 
in a closed envelope on the defendant’s desk and seized personal photo-
graphs. They subsequently obtained a warrant to search the computer 
hard drive, but delayed actually conducting the search until after the war-
rant had expired, and searched for items not covered by the warrant. 
Justice Fuerst of the Ontario Superior Court excluded the seized photo-
graphs, finding that the police had acted “recklessly” by opening the 
envelope with neither a search warrant nor Little’s consent. However, she 
admitted the evidence from the computer, even though she found that the 
police had acted “carelessly” and “recklessly” when conducting the 
computer search. She distinguished the photographs from the computer 
evidence on the grounds that the defendant’s privacy interest in the hard 
drive of his workplace computer was “at the lowest end of the scale”.184 
Further, she relied on the fact that the excluded photographs were not 
central to the Crown’s case, whereas the computer evidence was “criti-
cal” to the prosecution, which involved extremely serious charges (two 
counts of first degree murder).185  
While it is impossible to be certain how these cases would have been 
decided under the old Collins/Stillman framework, the post-Grant juris-
prudence suggests that renewed emphasis is being placed on the 
significance of police misconduct, and that courts are refraining from 
treating the seriousness of the offence as a trump card guaranteeing ad-
mission. The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Morelli reaffirms 
that even when there is no deliberate misconduct, police carelessness can 
sometime tip the first set of Grant factors to favour exclusion. However, 
Little serves as a reminder that the absence of police good faith will not 
always serve as an automatic ticket to exclusion if the other Grant factors 
are found to support admission, and that the seriousness of the underly-
ing offence has not dropped entirely out of the analysis.186 
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(c) Conclusions 
In summary, while the new Grant section 24(2) framework allows 
the Crown to secure the admission of much “conscriptive” evidence that 
would have been excluded under the first branch of the Collins/Stillman 
test, it also may help defence counsel to persuade trial judges to exclude 
evidence when the police have demonstrated flagrant disregard for, or 
ignorance of, the Charter. By trading certainty and predictability for 
“flexibility”, the Court’s new test will have the practical effect of making 
it more difficult for counsel on either side to predict the outcome of sec-
tion 24(2) applications. This may lead to more Charter issues being 
litigated, exacerbating the problem of overburdened trial lists and delay. 
Finally, by placing even more discretionary power in the hands of trial 
judges and emphasizing appellate deference, the Supreme Court’s new 
test is likely to increase the disparity of outcomes between similar cases. 
“Luck of the draw” at trial will become even more important. 
The Court’s new section 24(2) test can also be criticized for down-
playing the significance of exclusion as a remedy for a Charter violation. 
According to the Grant majority, excluding evidence under section 24(2) 
serves a purely societal purpose and is “not aimed at … providing com-
pensation to the accused”.187 However, section 24 is expressly framed as 
a remedial provision, suggesting that it has at least some corrective jus-
tice function.188 Indeed, the Court’s “standing” jurisprudence insists that 
evidence can be excluded under section 24(2) only at the request of a 
person who has suffered an infringement of his or her own personal 
Charter rights, a restriction that makes no sense if exclusion is viewed as 
entirely unrelated to the harm suffered by the claimant.189 Excluding un-
constitutionally obtained evidence undeniably has compensatory effects 
— in many cases, it restores the individual and the state to a position ap-
proximating that they would have occupied if the Charter had been 
respected.190 Recognizing this effect as one of section 24(2)’s purposes is 
                                                                                                             
that the degree of police misconduct outweighed by the minimal intrusiveness of the breach and the 
reliability of the evidence). 
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188
 Section 24(1) authorizes courts to grant to persons whose Charter rights have been in-
fringed “such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances”. Section 
24(2) provides for the exclusion of evidence “in proceedings under subsection (1)”. 
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 See, e.g., R. v. Edwards, [1996] S.C.J. No. 11, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128 (S.C.C.); R. v. Bel-
navis, [1997] S.C.J. No. 81, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 341 (S.C.C.). 
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 The position is only approximate, because in many cases the state retains the benefit of 
having removed contraband items from circulation. Even if excluding evidence results in an acquit-
tal, the defendant still loses the contraband (in the case at bar, worth several million dollars).  
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entirely consistent with the Grant majority’s wish to avoid “send[ing] the 
message that individual rights count for little”. The practical reality in the 
vast majority of criminal cases is that when section 24(2) exclusion is 
refused, the violation of the accused’s Charter rights goes entirely unre-
medied. As McLachlin J. (as she then was) observed in R. v. Williams, 
“[a] Charter right is meaningless, unless the accused is able to enforce 
it”.191 If the justice system routinely denies persons whose rights have 
been breached any compensation for the infringement, this must surely 
send the message that “rights count for little”. It is unfortunate that the 
Grant majority did not recognize this link and instead denied that section 
24(2) serves any corrective justice purpose. 
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